相关论文: Integrating Sequential Hypothesis Testing into Adv…

Adversarial decision-making in partially observable multi-agent systems requires sophisticated strategies for both deception and counter-deception. This paper presents a sequential hypothesis testing (SHT)-driven framework that captures the…

Systems operating in adversarial environments may inadvertently leak sensitive information to adversaries. To address this challenge, we revisit the linear-quadratic control framework and introduce deception to actively mislead adversaries.…

In this paper, we consider the problem of sequential binary hypothesis test in adversary environment based on observations from s sensors, with the caveat that a subset of c sensors is compromised by an adversary, whose observations can be…

We study a continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg game in which a leader seeks to accomplish a primary objective while inferring a hidden parameter of a rational follower. The follower solves an entropy-regularized tracking problem and…

This paper investigates strategic interactions within a three party deception security game involving a defender, an insider, and external attackers. We propose a robust deception mechanism where the leader manipulates game parameters…

Cyber deception is an emerging proactive defense strategy to counter increasingly sophisticated attacks such as Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) by misleading and distracting attackers from critical assets. However, since deception…

Game-theoretic inverse learning is the problem of inferring a player's objectives from their actions. We formulate an inverse learning problem in a Stackelberg game between a leader and a follower, where each player's action is the…

This paper concerns sequential hypothesis testing in competitive multi-agent systems where agents exchange potentially manipulated information. Specifically, a two-agent scenario is studied where each agent aims to correctly infer the true…

We study discounted infinitely repeated games in which players agree on a cooperative mixed action profile but, at each step, observe only the realized pure actions. This form of imperfect monitoring breaks classical trigger strategies,…

Autonomous systems are increasingly expected to operate in the presence of adversaries, though adversaries may infer sensitive information simply by observing a system. Therefore, present a deceptive sequential decision-making framework…

We consider a finite horizon repeated game with $N$ selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions, which are publicly observed. Their actions and types jointly determine their instantaneous rewards. In each period,…

We consider a repeated sequential game between a learner, who plays first, and an opponent who responds to the chosen action. We seek to design strategies for the learner to successfully interact with the opponent. While most previous…

This work introduces the Query/Hit (Q/H) learning model. The setup consists of two agents. One agent, Alice, has access to a streaming source, while the other, Bob, does not have direct access to the source. Communication occurs through…

We introduce a game-theoretic framework to study the hypothesis testing problem, in the presence of an adversary aiming at preventing a correct decision. Specifically, the paper considers a scenario in which an analyst has to decide whether…

Self-determination theory (SDT), a psychological theory of human motivation, is a prominent paradigm in human-computer interaction (HCI) research on games. However, our prior literature review observed a trend towards shallow applications…

Information uncertainty is one of the major challenges facing applications of game theory. In the context of Stackelberg games, various approaches have been proposed to deal with the leader's incomplete knowledge about the follower's…

The technique of ``testing by betting" frames nonparametric sequential hypothesis testing as a multiple-round game, where a player bets on future observations that arrive in a streaming fashion, accumulates wealth that quantifies evidence…

An insider is defined as a team member who covertly deviates from the team's optimal collaborative control strategy in pursuit of a private objective, while maintaining an outward appearance of cooperation. Such insider threats can severely…

Deception plays a crucial role in strategic interactions with incomplete information. Motivated by security applications, we study a class of two-player turn-based deterministic games with one-sided incomplete information, in which player 1…

We consider a pursuit-evasion game [11] played between two agents, 'Blue' (the pursuer) and 'Red' (the evader), over $T$ time steps. Red aims to attack Blue's territory. Blue's objective is to intercept Red by time $T$ and thereby limit the…