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The majority of online marketplaces offer promotion programs to sellers to acquire additional customers for their products. These programs typically allow sellers to allocate advertising budgets to promote their products, with higher…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2025-02-05 Anastasiia Soboleva , Alexander Ledovsky , Yuriy Dorn , Egor Samosvat , Andrey Tikhanov , Fyodor Prazdnikov

The internet advertising market is a multi-billion dollar industry, in which advertisers buy thousands of ad placements every day by repeatedly participating in auctions. An important and ubiquitous feature of these auctions is the presence…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2022-10-11 Santiago Balseiro , Christian Kroer , Rachitesh Kumar

Learning to bid in repeated first-price auctions is a fundamental problem at the interface of game theory and machine learning, which has seen a recent surge in interest due to the transition of display advertising to first-price auctions.…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-07-09 Rachitesh Kumar , Jon Schneider , Balasubramanian Sivan

The auction theory literature has so far focused mostly on the design of mechanisms that takes the revenue or the efficiency as a yardstick. However, scenarios where the {\it capacity}, which we define as \textit{``the number of bidders the…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2007-11-13 Sudhir Kumar Singh , Vwani P. Roychowdhury

Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used…

人工智能 · 计算机科学 2009-04-14 Jinzhong Niu , Simon Parsons

Understanding bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions remains an ongoing challenge for researchers. Despite their widespread use, theoretical insights into the bidding behavior, revenue ranking, and efficiency of commonly used multi-unit…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-08-09 Peyman Khezr , Kendall Taylor

Ad exchanges are an emerging platform for trading advertisement slots on the web with billions of dollars revenue per year. Every time a user visits a web page, the publisher of that web page can ask an ad exchange to auction off the ad…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2016-04-20 Oren Ben-Zwi , Monika Henzinger , Veronika Loitzenbauer

The connection between games and no-regret algorithms has been widely studied in the literature. A fundamental result is that when all players play no-regret strategies, this produces a sequence of actions whose time-average is a…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2020-09-15 Zhe Feng , Guru Guruganesh , Christopher Liaw , Aranyak Mehta , Abhishek Sethi

The issue of fairness in AI arises from discriminatory practices in applications like job recommendations and risk assessments, emphasising the need for algorithms that do not discriminate based on group characteristics. This concern is…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-08-12 Fengjuan Jia , Mengxiao Zhang , Jiamou Liu , Bakh Khoussainov

E-commerce platforms usually present an ordered list, mixed with several organic items and an advertisement, in response to each user's page view request. This list, the outcome of ad auction and allocation processes, directly impacts the…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-04-12 Xuejian Li , Ze Wang , Bingqi Zhu , Fei He , Yongkang Wang , Xingxing Wang

Recently, joint advertising has gained significant attention as an effective approach to enhancing the efficiency and revenue of advertising slot allocation. Unlike traditional advertising, which allocates advertising slots exclusively to a…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2025-12-18 Chun Fang , Luowen Liu , Kun Huang , Tao Ruan , Sheng Yan , Zhen Wang , Huan Li , Qiang Liu , Xingxing Wang

As Large Language Models (LLMs) transition into conversational agents, generative advertising emerges as a crucial monetization strategy. However, embedding advertisements within unstructured LLM outputs introduces a critical trilemma:…

机器学习 · 计算机科学 2026-05-12 Peiran Yun , Wenxin Xu , Jiayuan Liu , Yihang Zhang , Liang Zeng , Lingkai Kong , Tonghan Wang

In this paper, we study the problem of learning to bid in repeated first-price auctions with budget constraints. In each period, the decision maker needs to submit a bid to win the auction and maximize the total collected reward, subject to…

最优化与控制 · 数学 2026-03-10 Zeng Fu , Jiashuo Jiang , Yuan Zhou

Mature internet advertising platforms offer high-level campaign management tools to help advertisers run their campaigns, often abstracting away the intricacies of how each ad is placed and focusing on aggregate metrics of interest to…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2021-09-07 Vincent Conitzer , Christian Kroer , Debmalya Panigrahi , Okke Schrijvers , Eric Sodomka , Nicolas E. Stier-Moses , Chris Wilkens

Optimal auction design is a fundamental problem in algorithmic game theory. This problem is notoriously difficult already in very simple settings. Recent work in differentiable economics showed that neural networks can efficiently learn…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-07-18 Christoph Hertrich , Yixin Tao , László A. Végh

The Animal-AI Environment is a unique game-based research platform designed to facilitate collaboration between the artificial intelligence and comparative cognition research communities. In this paper, we present the latest version of the…

Modern commercial Internet search engines display advertisements along side the search results in response to user queries. Such sponsored search relies on market mechanisms to elicit prices for these advertisements, making use of an…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2008-12-18 Jon Feldman , S. Muthukrishnan

Automated mechanism design (AMD) uses computational methods for mechanism design. Differentiable economics is a form of AMD that uses deep learning to learn mechanism designs and has enabled strong progress in AMD in recent years.…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-11-06 Tonghan Wang , Yanchen Jiang , David C. Parkes

We present a deep learning solution to address the challenges of simulating realistic synthetic first-price sealed-bid auction data. The complexities encountered in this type of auction data include high-cardinality discrete feature spaces…

综合经济学 · 经济学 2024-11-13 Igor Sadoune , Andrea Lodi , Marcelin Joanis

We perform a simulation-based analysis of keyword auctions modeled as one-shot games of incomplete information to study a series of mechanism design questions. Our first question addresses the degree to which incentive compatibility fails…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2012-05-14 Yevgeniy Vorobeychik