相关论文: Equilibria in a Hypercube Spatial Voting Model

In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of…

We study the voting game where agents' preferences are endogenously decided by the information they receive, and they can collaborate in a group. We show that strategic voting behaviors have a positive impact on leading to the ``correct''…

A description of static equilibria in the noisy binary choice (Ising) game on complete and random graphs resulting from maximisation of the likelihood of system configurations is presented. An equivalence of such likelihood equilibria to…

Markovian network equilibrium generalizes the classical Wardrop equilibrium in network games. At a Markovian network equilibrium, each player of the game solves a Markov decision process instead of a shortest path problem. We propose two…

Classical spatial models of two-party competition typically predict convergence to the median voter, yet real-world party systems often exhibit persistent and asymmetric polarization. We develop a spatial model of two-party competition in…

Many interactions result in a socially suboptimal equilibrium, or in a non-equilibrium state, from which arriving at an equilibrium through simple dynamics can be impossible of too long. Aiming to achieve a certain equilibrium, we persuade,…

Members of a shareholder meeting or legislative committee have greater or smaller voting power than meets the eye if the nucleolus of the induced majority game differs from the voting weight distribution. We establish a new sufficient…

Equilibrium in Economics has been seldom addressed in a situation where some variables are discrete. This work introduces a problem related to lot-sizing with several players, and analyses some strategies which are likely to be found in…

Is there an equilibrium for distributed consensus when all agents except one collude to steer the decision value towards their preference? If an equilibrium exists, then an $n-1$ size coalition cannot do better by deviating from the…

We introduce a natural variant of weighted voting games, which we refer to as k-Prize Weighted Voting Games. Such games consist of n players with weights, and k prizes, of possibly differing values. The players form coalitions, and the i-th…

We study a generic family of two-player continuous-time nonzero-sum stopping games modeling a war of attrition with symmetric information and stochastic payoffs that depend on an homogeneous linear diffusion. We first show that any…

We consider spatial voting where candidates are located in the Euclidean $d$-dimensional space, and each voter ranks candidates based on their distance from the voter's ideal point. We explore the case where information about the location…

This paper has two central aims: first, to provide simple conditions under which the generalized games in choice form and, consequently, the abstract economies, admit equilibrium; second, to study the solvability of several types of systems…

Each period, two players bargain over a unit of surplus. Each player chooses between remaining flexible and committing to a take-it-or-leave-it offer at a cost. If players' committed demands are incompatible, then the current-period surplus…

We introduce a notion of subgames for stochastic timing games and the related notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium in possibly mixed strategies. While a good notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium for continuous-time games is not available…

Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…

In a satisficing equilibrium each agent $i$ plays one of her top $k_i$ actions in response to the actions of the other agents. Our concept unifies models of bounded rationality and yields predictions that differ from canonical solution…

We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…

We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in stochastic multiplayer games with $\omega$-regular objectives. While the existence of an equilibrium whose payoff falls into a certain interval may be undecidable, we…

We extend the construction of equilibria for linear-quadratic and mean-variance portfolio problems available in the literature to a large class of mean-field time-inconsistent stochastic control problems in continuous time. Our approach…