相关论文: Optimal Wage Band for Job Matching with Signaling

This paper analyzes a steady state matching model interrelating the education and labor sectors. In this model, a heterogeneous population of students match with teachers to enhance their cognitive skills. As adults, they then choose to…

We study allocation problems without monetary transfers where agents have correlated types, i.e., hold private information about one another. Such peer information is relevant in various settings, including science funding, allocation of…

This paper links matching markets with aligned preferences to optimal transport theory. We show that stability, efficiency, and fairness emerge as solutions to a parametric family of optimal transport problems. The parameter reflects…

We study equilibria of markets with $m$ heterogeneous indivisible goods and $n$ consumers with combinatorial preferences. It is well known that a competitive equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist when valuations are not gross substitutes.…

We investigate in this paper the theory and econometrics of optimal matchings with competing criteria. The surplus from a marriage match, for instance, may depend both on the incomes and on the educations of the partners, as well as on…

We revisit the classic job-market signaling model of \cite{spence1973job}, introducing profit-seeking schools as intermediaries that design the mapping from candidates' efforts to job-market signals. Each school commits to an attendance fee…

We study allocation mechanisms that utilize costly signaling as a screening tool. A social planner aims to maximize social welfare, defined as the weighted sum of agents' utilities, while implementing a specific allocation rule. Within a…

An employer contracts with a worker to incentivize efforts whose productivity depends on ability; the worker then enters a market that pays him contingent on ability evaluation. With non-additive monitoring technology, the interdependence…

We study a heterogeneous agent macroeconomic model with an infinite number of households and firms competing in a labor market. Each household earns income and engages in consumption at each time step while aiming to maximize a concave…

We study a competitive electricity market equilibrium with two trading stages, day-ahead and real-time. The welfare of each market agent is exposed to uncertainty (here from renewable energy production), while agent information on the…

Signaling is an important topic in the study of asymmetric information in economic settings. In particular, the transparency of information available to a seller in an auction setting is a question of major interest. We introduce the study…

We consider games in which players search for a hidden prize, and they have asymmetric information about the prize location. We study the social payoff in equilibria of these games. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of an…

We consider the problem faced by a service platform that needs to match limited supply with demand but also to learn the attributes of new users in order to match them better in the future. We introduce a benchmark model with heterogeneous…

In this work, we study the system of interacting non-cooperative two Q-learning agents, where one agent has the privilege of observing the other's actions. We show that this information asymmetry can lead to a stable outcome of population…

We examine the dynamics of informational efficiency in a market with asymmetrically informed, boundedly rational traders who adaptively learn optimal strategies using simple multiarmed bandit (MAB) algorithms. The strategies available to…

This paper develops a new data-driven approach to characterizing latent worker skill and job task heterogeneity by applying an empirical tool from network theory to large-scale Brazilian administrative data on worker--job matching. We…

We study the competition for partners in two-sided matching markets with heterogeneous agent preferences, with a focus on how the equilibrium outcomes depend on the connectivity in the market. We model random partially connected markets,…

Allocation of spectrum is an important policy issue and decisions taken have ramifications for future growth of wireless communications and achieving universal connectivity. In this paper, on a common footing we compare the social welfare…

The academic job market for new statisticians is highly congested at the interview stage, where departments must rank and select candidates from large applicant pools without credible signals of candidate interest. As a result, interviews…

We consider a market in which both suppliers and consumers compete for a product via scalar-parameterized supply offers and demand bids. Scalar-parameterized offers/bids are appealing due to their modeling simplicity and desirable…