相关论文: Nonparametric Strategy Test

We introduce a two-player model of reinforcement learning with memory. Past actions of an iterated game are stored in a memory and used to determine player's next action. To examine the behaviour of the model some approximate methods are…

Given a skew-symmetric matrix, the corresponding two-player symmetric zero-sum game is defined as follows: one player, the row player, chooses a row and the other player, the column player, chooses a column. The payoff of the row player is…

We study the problem of finding equilibrium strategies in multi-agent games with incomplete payoff information, where the payoff matrices are only known to the players up to some bounded uncertainty sets. In such games, an ex-post…

We study the asymptotic macroscopic properties of the mixed majority-minority game, modeling a population in which two types of heterogeneous adaptive agents, namely ``fundamentalists'' driven by differentiation and ``trend-followers''…

Major advances in Question Answering technology were needed for IBM Watson to play Jeopardy! at championship level -- the show requires rapid-fire answers to challenging natural language questions, broad general knowledge, high precision,…

We conduct a comprehensive analysis of the discrete-time exponential-weights dynamic with a constant step size on all general-sum and symmetric $2 \times 2$ normal-form games, i.e. games with $2$ pure strategies per player, and where the…

Evolution of agents' dynamics of multiagent systems under consensus protocol in the face of jamming attacks is discussed, where centralized parties are able to influence the control signals of the agents. In this paper we focus on a…

We present an algorithm that identifies the reasoning patterns of agents in a game, by iteratively examining the graph structure of its Multi-Agent Influence Diagram (MAID) representation. If the decision of an agent participates in no…

We consider concurrent games played on graphs. At every round of a game, each player simultaneously and independently selects a move; the moves jointly determine the transition to a successor state. Two basic objectives are the safety…

We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…

Stochastic games have become a prevalent framework for studying long-term multi-agent interactions, especially in the context of multi-agent reinforcement learning. In this work, we comprehensively investigate the concept of constant-memory…

In this article we evaluate the statistical evidence that a population of students learn about the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the centipede game via repeated play of the game. This is done by formulating a model in which a…

In this paper, we present a framework for multi-agent learning in a nonstationary dynamic network environment. More specifically, we examine projected gradient play in smooth monotone repeated network games in which the agents'…

Optimization of parameterized policies for reinforcement learning (RL) is an important and challenging problem in artificial intelligence. Among the most common approaches are algorithms based on gradient ascent of a score function…

We propose a general framework for statistical inference on the overall strengths of players in pairwise comparisons, allowing for potential shifts in the covariate distribution. These covariates capture important contextual information…

This paper focuses on the comparison of networks on the basis of statistical inference. For that purpose, we rely on smooth graphon models as a nonparametric modeling strategy that is able to capture complex structural patterns. The graphon…

Nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with impulse controls offer a realistic and far-reaching modelling framework for applications within finance, energy markets, and other areas, but the difficulty in solving such problems has…

In this paper, we investigate the noncooperative games of multi-agent systems. Different from existing noncooperative games, our formulation involves the high-order nonlinear dynamics of players, and the communication topologies among…

Consider a two-player game repeated N times. Player 1 can choose between two styles (for interpretability, offensive and defensive), whereas Player 2 uses a single fixed style. Let X N\,:= \#wins -\#losses for Player 1 after N games, and…

This paper studies the equilibrium properties of the ``obvious strategy profile'' in large finite-player games. Each player in such a strategy profile simply adopts a randomized strategy as she would have used in a symmetric equilibrium of…