相关论文: Bayesian Persuasion for Containing SIS Epidemics w…
We consider a susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) epidemic model in which a large group of individuals decide whether to adopt partially effective protection without being aware of their individual infection status. Each individual…
In this paper, we investigate game-theoretic strategies for containing spreading processes on large-scale networks. Specifically, we consider the class of networked susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) epidemics where a large population…
During an epidemic, the information available to individuals in the society deeply influences their belief of the epidemic spread, and consequently the preventive measures they take to stay safe from the infection. In this paper, we develop…
We study decentralized protection strategies against Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemics on networks. We consider a population game framework where nodes choose whether or not to vaccinate themselves, and the epidemic risk is…
In the classical Bayesian persuasion model an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. The informed player, the sender, knows the state of nature, while the uninformed one, the receiver, does not. The informed…
We study a bi-virus susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) epidemic model in which individuals are either susceptible or infected with one of two virus strains, and consider mutation-driven transitions between strains. The general case of…
In this paper, we develop a mean-field game model for SEIR epidemics on heterogeneous contact networks, where individuals choose state-dependent contact effort to balance infection losses against the social and economic costs of isolation.…
The spontaneous behavioral changes of the agents during an epidemic can have significant effects on the delay and the prevalence of its spread. In this work, we study a social distancing game among the agents of a population, who determine…
An epidemic spreading in a network calls for a decision on the part of the network members: They should decide whether to protect themselves or not. Their decision depends on the trade-off between their perceived risk of being infected and…
Empirically, many strategic settings are characterized by stable outcomes in which players' decisions are publicly observed, yet no player takes the opportunity to deviate. To analyze such situations in the presence of incomplete…
Deception plays a critical role in many interactions in communication and network security. Game-theoretic models called "cheap talk signaling games" capture the dynamic and information asymmetric nature of deceptive interactions. But…
How does one test empirically the hypothesis that a decision maker (DM) is being influenced by information via Bayesian persuasion? In this paper, I consider a DM whose state-dependent preferences are known to an analyst, who sees the…
The Bayesian persuasion model studies communication between an informed sender and a receiver with a payoff-relevant action, emphasizing the ability of a sender to extract maximal surplus from his informational advantage. In this paper we…
We consider a sender-receiver game with an outside option for the sender. After the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject. We study situations in which the sender's approval is crucial to…
Many communication, sensor network, and networked control problems involve agents (decision makers) which have either misaligned objective functions or subjective probabilistic models. In the context of such setups, we consider binary…
We study networks of human decision-makers who independently decide how to protect themselves against Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemics. Motivated by studies in behavioral economics showing that humans perceive probabilities…
When users lack specific knowledge of various system parameters, their uncertainty may lead them to make undesirable deviations in their decision making. To alleviate this, an informed system operator may elect to signal information to…
We investigate a two-period Bayesian persuasion game, where the receiver faces a decision, akin to a one-armed bandit problem: to undertake an action, gaining noisy information and a corresponding positive or negative payoff, or to refrain.…
We investigate the evolution of epidemics over dynamical networks when nodes choose to interact with others in a selfish and decentralized manner. Specifically, we analyze the susceptible-asymptomatic-infected-recovered (SAIR) epidemic in…
Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. For the applications of cyber deception, non-cooperative games become a natural choice of models to capture the adversarial interactions…