相关论文: The Design and Regulation of Exchanges: A Formal A…

Auctions are important mechanisms extensively implemented in various markets, e.g., search engines' keyword auctions, antique auctions, etc. Finding an optimal auction mechanism is extremely difficult due to the constraints of imperfect…

We provide efficient estimation methods for first- and second-price auctions under independent (asymmetric) private values and partial observability. Given a finite set of observations, each comprising the identity of the winner and the…

Auctions play an important role in electronic commerce, and have been used to solve problems in distributed computing. Automated approaches to designing effective auction mechanisms are helpful in reducing the burden of traditional game…

Continuous double auctions such as the limit order book employed by exchanges are widely used in practice to match buyers and sellers of a variety of financial instruments. In this work, we develop an agent-based model for trading in a…

In this paper we present and evaluate a general framework for the design of truthful auctions for matching agents in a dynamic, two-sided market. A single commodity, such as a resource or a task, is bought and sold by multiple buyers and…

Motivated by online display ad exchanges, we study a setting in which an exchange repeatedly interacts with bidders who have quota, making decisions about which subsets of bidders are called to participate in ad-slot-specific auctions. A…

Novel auction schemes are constantly being designed. Their design has significant consequences for the allocation of goods and the revenues generated. But how to tell whether a new design has the desired properties, such as efficiency, i.e.…

We study a phenomenological model for the continuous double auction, equivalent to two independent $M/M/1$ queues. The continuous double auction defines a continuous-time random walk for trade prices. The conditions for ergodicity of the…

Exploiting a precise reproduction of a stock exchange, the robustness of the Continuous Double Auction (CDA) mechanism, evaluated by means of the waiting time distributions, has been proved versus 36 different set ups made by varying both…

The dynamics of financial markets are driven by the interactions between participants, as well as the trading mechanisms and regulatory frameworks that govern these interactions. Decision-makers would rather not ignore the impact of other…

In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented a truthful mechanism for double auctions, attaining asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade without any prior information on the valuations of the traders. McAfee's mechanism handles…

The Maker Protocol is a decentralized finance application that enables collateralized lending. The application uses open-bid, second-price auctions to complete its loan liquidation process. In this paper, we develop a bidding function for…

In this paper, we study sequential auctions with two budget constrained bidders and any number of identical items. All prior results on such auctions consider only two items. We construct a canonical outcome of the auction that is the only…

Formal verification entails testing software to ensure it operates as specified. Smart contracts are self-executing contracts with the terms of the agreement directly written into lines of code. They run on blockchain platforms and…

As computational agents are developed for increasingly complicated e-commerce applications, the complexity of the decisions they face demands advances in artificial intelligence techniques. For example, an agent representing a seller in an…

Electronic payment platforms are estimated to process billions oftransactions daily, with the cumulative value of these transactionspotentially reaching into the trillions. Even a minor error within thishigh-volume environment could…

In economics, there are many ways to describe the interaction between a "seller" and a "buyer". The most common one, with which we interact almost every day, is selling for a fixed price. This option is perfect for selling a mass product,…

We study a repeated trading problem in which a mechanism designer facilitates trade between a single seller and multiple buyers. Our model generalizes the classic bilateral trade setting to a multi-buyer environment. Specifically, the…

We present a general framework for designing approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms for multi-item additive auctions, which applies to both truthful and non-truthful auctions. Given a (not necessarily truthful) single-item auction format…

We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…