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We consider a dynamical approach to sequential games. By restricting the convertibility relation over strategy profiles, we obtain a semi-potential (in the sense of Kukushkin), and we show that in finite games the corresponding restriction…

This paper studies the optimality and complexity of Follow-the-Perturbed-Leader (FTPL) policy in $m$-set semi-bandit problems. FTPL has been studied extensively as a promising candidate of an efficient algorithm with favorable regret for…

Adaptivity to the difficulties of a problem is a key property in sequential decision-making problems to broaden the applicability of algorithms. Follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL) has recently emerged as one of the most promising…

To establish last-iterate convergence for Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) algorithms in learning a Nash equilibrium (NE) of extensive-form games (EFGs), recent studies reformulate learning an NE of the original EFG as learning the…

Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) -- where multiple agents learn to interact in a shared dynamic environment -- permeates across a wide range of critical applications. While there has been substantial progress on understanding the…

Mean Field Games (MFGs) offer a powerful framework for studying large-scale multi-agent systems. Yet, learning Nash equilibria in MFGs remains a challenging problem, particularly when the initial distribution is unknown or when the…

In this paper, we study last-iterate convergence of learning algorithms in bilinear saddle-point problems, a preferable notion of convergence that captures the day-to-day behavior of learning dynamics. We focus on the challenging setting…

Last-iterate behaviors of learning algorithms in repeated two-player zero-sum games have been extensively studied due to their wide applications in machine learning and related tasks. Typical algorithms that exhibit the last-iterate…

We consider the nonstochastic multi-agent multi-armed bandit problem with agents collaborating via a communication network with delays. We show a lower bound for individual regret of all agents. We show that with suitable regularizers and…

This paper introduces the new concept of (follower) satisfaction in Stackelberg games and compares the standard Stackelberg game with its satisfaction version. Simulation results are presented which suggest that the follower adopting…

The growing literature of Federated Learning (FL) has recently inspired Federated Reinforcement Learning (FRL) to encourage multiple agents to federatively build a better decision-making policy without sharing raw trajectories. Despite its…

In this paper, we consider two-player zero-sum matrix and stochastic games and develop learning dynamics that are payoff-based, convergent, rational, and symmetric between the two players. Specifically, the learning dynamics for matrix…

We consider the adversarial linear bandits setting and present a unified algorithmic framework that bridges Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) and Follow-the-Perturbed-Leader (FTPL) methods, extending the known connection between them…

We tackle the problem of Non-stochastic Control (NSC) with the aim of obtaining algorithms whose policy regret is proportional to the difficulty of the controlled environment. Namely, we tailor the Follow The Regularized Leader (FTRL)…

The approximation of mixed Nash equilibria (MNE) for zero-sum games with mean-field interacting players has recently raised much interest in machine learning. In this paper we propose a mean-field gradient descent dynamics for finding the…

This paper addresses policy learning in non-stationary environments and games with continuous actions. Rather than the classical reward maximization mechanism, inspired by the ideas of follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL) and mirror descent…

This paper covers n-tuple-based reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms for games. We present new algorithms for TD-, SARSA- and Q-learning which work seamlessly on various games with arbitrary number of players. This is achieved by taking a…

Given a bimatrix game, the associated leadership or commitment games are defined as the games at which one player, the leader, commits to a (possibly mixed) strategy and the other player, the follower, chooses his strategy after having…

Starting from a heuristic learning scheme for N-person games, we derive a new class of continuous-time learning dynamics consisting of a replicator-like drift adjusted by a penalty term that renders the boundary of the game's strategy space…

Learning in zero-sum games studies a situation where multiple agents competitively learn their strategy. In such multi-agent learning, we often see that the strategies cycle around their optimum, i.e., Nash equilibrium. When a game…