相关论文: On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal…

We revisit the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for allocating divisible items among two agents who have linear utilities, where payments are disallowed and there is no prior information on the agents' preferences. The…

We study robustly optimal mechanisms for selling multiple items. The seller maximizes revenue against a worst-case distribution of a buyer's valuations within a set of distributions, called an "ambiguity" set. We identify the exact forms of…

The framework of differential inclusions encompasses modern optimal control and the calculus of variations. Necessary optimality conditions in the literature identify potentially optimal paths, but do not show how to perturb paths to…

We study revenue maximization in multi-item auctions, where bidders have subadditive valuations over independent items. Providing a simple mechanism that is approximately revenue-optimal in this setting is a major open problem in mechanism…

We show that the Revenue-Optimal Deterministic Mechanism Design problem for a single additive buyer is #P-hard, even when the distributions have support size 2 for each item and, more importantly, even when the optimal solution is…

The problem of non-iterative one-shot and non-destructive correction of unavoidable mistakes arises in all Artificial Intelligence applications in the real world. Its solution requires robust separation of samples with errors from samples…

Heterogeneous datasets emerge in various machine learning and optimization applications that feature different input sources, types or formats. Most models or methods do not natively tackle heterogeneity. Hence, such datasets are often…

The low-degree polynomial framework has emerged as a powerful tool for providing evidence of statistical-computational gaps in high-dimensional inference. For detection problems, the standard approach bounds the low-degree advantage through…

We study the design of prior-independent auctions in a setting with heterogeneous bidders. In particular, we consider the setting of selling to $n$ bidders whose values are drawn from $n$ independent but not necessarily identical…

A $d$-dimensional random array on a nonempty set $I$ is a stochastic process $\boldsymbol{X}=\langle X_s:s\in \binom{I}{d}\rangle$ indexed by the set $\binom{I}{d}$ of all $d$-element subsets of $I$. We obtain structural decompositions of…

Achieving invariance to nuisance transformations is a fundamental challenge in the construction of robust and reliable vision systems. Existing approaches to invariance scale exponentially with the dimension of the family of…

In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is the following: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that…

It is known that if the underlying iterated function system satisfies the open set condition, then the upper box dimension of an inhomogeneous self-similar set is the maximum of the upper box dimensions of the homogeneous counterpart and…

Finding the optimal (revenue-maximizing) mechanism to sell multiple items has been a prominent and notoriously difficult open problem. Existing work has mainly focused on deriving analytical results tailored to a particular class of…

In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is as follows: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that remain.…

Combining additive models and neural networks allows to broaden the scope of statistical regression and extend deep learning-based approaches by interpretable structured additive predictors at the same time. Existing attempts uniting the…

We consider the problem of designing a revenue-optimal mechanism in the two-item, single-buyer, unit-demand setting when the buyer's valuations, $(z_1, z_2)$, are uniformly distributed in an arbitrary rectangle $[c,c+b_1]\times[c,c+b_2]$ in…

A buyer wishes to purchase a durable good from a seller who in each period chooses a mechanism under limited commitment. The buyer's valuation is binary and fully persistent. We show that posted prices implement all equilibrium outcomes of…

For multiple scientific endeavors it is common to measure a phenomenon of interest in more than one ways. We make observations of objects from several different perspectives in space, at different points in time; we may also measure…

We study the problem of bounding the posterior distribution of discrete probabilistic programs with unbounded support, loops, and conditioning. Loops pose the main difficulty in this setting: even if exact Bayesian inference is possible,…