相关论文: Asymptotically stable matchings and evolutionary d…
Stable matching in a community consisting of $N$ men and $N$ women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and…
In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…
Since the introduction of the stable marriage problem (SMP) by Gale and Shapley (1962), several variants and extensions have been investigated. While this variety is useful to widen the application potential, each variant requires a new…
In this work, we consider ranking problems among a finite set of candidates: for instance, selecting the top-$k$ items among a larger list of candidates or obtaining the full ranking of all items in the set. These problems are often…
The stable marriage (SM) problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools, or more generally to any two-sided market. In the classical formulation, n…
In population games, a large population of players, modeled as a continuum, is divided into subpopulations, and the fitness or payoff of each subpopulation depends on the overall population composition. Evolutionary dynamics describe how…
This study investigates the relationship between resilience of control systems to attacks and the information available to malicious attackers. Specifically, it is shown that control systems are guaranteed to be secure in an asymptotic…
This paper analyses the stability of cycles within a heteroclinic network lying in a three-dimensional manifold formed by six cycles, for a one-parameter model developed in the context of game theory. We show the asymptotic stability of the…
Dynamics in a distributed system are self-stabilizing if they are guaranteed to reach a stable state regardless of how the system is initialized. Game dynamics are uncoupled if each player's behavior is independent of the other players'…
This paper proposes a co-evolutionary model of directed graphs and three opinions, i.e., conservative$(+)$, neutral$(\odot)$ and liberal$(-)$. Agents update both opinions and social relationships with bias. We find that an emergent game…
The game interactions among individuals in nature are often uncertain and dynamically evolving, significantly influencing the persistence of cooperation. However, it remains a formidable challenge to effectively characterize these dynamic…
Evolutionary game theory has impacted many fields of research by providing a mathematical framework for studying the evolution and maintenance of social and moral behaviors. This success is owed in large part to the demonstration that the…
In the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage model (where no money is involved) and the assignment model (where payments are involved). Roth and Sotomayor (1990) asked for an explanation for the…
In evolutionary game theory, it is customary to be partial to the dynamical models possessing fixed points so that they may be understood as the attainment of evolutionary stability, and hence, Nash equilibrium. Any show of periodic or…
We model evolution according to an asymmetric game as occurring in multiple finite populations, one for each role in the game, and study the effect of subjecting individuals to stochastic strategy mutations. We show that, when these…
In their seminal work on the Stable Marriage Problem, Gale and Shapley describe an algorithm which finds a stable matching in $O(n^2)$ communication rounds. Their algorithm has a natural interpretation as a distributed algorithm where each…
Dynamics of evolutionary games strongly depend on underlying networks. We study the coevolutionary prisoner's dilemma in which players change their local networks as well as strategies (i.e., cooperate or defect). This topic has been…
It is well-known that wave-type equations with memory, under appropriate assumptions on the memory kernel, are uniformly exponentially stable. On the other hand, time delay effects may destroy this behavior. Here, we consider the…
We present a mechanism for computing asymptotically stable school optimal matchings, while guaranteeing that it is an asymptotic dominant strategy for every student to report their true preferences to the mechanism. Our main tool in this…
When computing stable matchings, it is usually assumed that the preferences of the agents in the matching market are fixed. However, in many realistic scenarios, preferences change over time. Consequently, an initially stable matching may…