相关论文: Approximating Nash Equilibrium for Production Cont…

We study mean field portfolio games with random market parameters, where each player is concerned with not only her own wealth but also relative performance to her competitors. We use the martingale optimality principle approach to…

We consider a class of dynamic collective choice models with social interactions, whereby a large number of non-uniform agents have to individually settle on one of multiple discrete alternative choices, with the relevance of their would-be…

This paper proposes a strategic model of pollution control. A firm, representative of the productive sector of a country, aims at maximizing its profits by expanding its production. Assuming that the output of production is proportional to…

In this work, we study the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem for monotone generalized noncooperative games with set constraints and shared affine inequality constraints. A distributed regularized penalty method is proposed. The…

The paper studies the convergence, as $N$ tends to infinity, of a system of $N$ coupled Hamilton-Jacobi equations, the Nash system. This system arises in differential game theory. We describe the limit problem in terms of the so-called…

We consider $n$ risk-averse agents who compete for liquidity in an Almgren--Chriss market impact model. Mathematically, this situation can be described by a Nash equilibrium for a certain linear-quadratic differential game with state…

This paper investigates design of noncooperative games from an optimization and control theoretic perspective. Pricing mechanisms are used as a design tool to ensure that the Nash equilibrium of a fairly general class of noncooperative…

In this paper we investigate Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games whose cost functionals are defined by a system of coupled backward stochastic differential equations. We obtain an existence…

In this paper, we study deterministic mean field games for agents who operate in a bounded domain. In this case, the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria cannot be deduced as for unrestricted state space because, for a large set of…

Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally regards preferences as more fundamental. To leverage…

We establish the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium for a stochastic mean-field game of optimal investment. The analysis covers both finite and infinite time horizons, and the mean-field interaction of the representative company…

Financial markets and more generally macro-economic models involve a large number of individuals interacting through variables such as prices resulting from the aggregate behavior of all the agents. Mean field games have been introduced to…

We consider an augmented version of Merton's portfolio choice problem, where trading by large investors influences the price of underlying financial asset leading to strategic interaction among investors, with investors deciding their…

We consider continuous-time mean-field stochastic games with strategic complementarities. The interaction between the representative productive firm and the population of rivals comes through the price at which the produced good is sold and…

The aim of this paper is to study first order Mean field games subject to a linear controlled dynamics on $\mathbb R^{d}$. For this kind of problems, we define Nash equilibria (called Mean Field Games equilibria), as Borel probability…

This study investigates differential games with motion-payoff uncertainty in continuous-time settings. We propose a framework where players update their beliefs about uncertain parameters using continuous Bayesian updating. Theoretical…

Building upon the results in [Hinterm\"uller et al., SIAM J. Optim, '15], generalized Nash equilibrium problems are considered, in which the feasible set of each player is influenced by the decisions of their competitors. This is realized…

We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…

We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank…

A group of players which contain n sellers and n buyers bargain over the partitions of n pies. A seller(/buyer) has to reach an agreement with a buyer (/seller) on the division of a pie. The players bargain in a system like the stock…