相关论文: Robust No-Regret Learning in Min-Max Stackelberg G…

Partial monitoring is a general model for sequential learning with limited feedback formalized as a game between two players. In this game, the learner chooses an action and at the same time the opponent chooses an outcome, then the learner…

In this paper, we examine the long-run behavior of regularized, no-regret learning in finite games. A well-known result in the field states that the empirical frequencies of no-regret play converge to the game's set of coarse correlated…

In the convex optimization approach to online regret minimization, many methods have been developed to guarantee a $O(\sqrt{T})$ bound on regret for subdifferentiable convex loss functions with bounded subgradients, by using a reduction to…

We study how to learn $\epsilon$-optimal strategies in zero-sum imperfect information games (IIG) with trajectory feedback. In this setting, players update their policies sequentially based on their observations over a fixed number of…

Understanding the behavior of no-regret dynamics in general $N$-player games is a fundamental question in online learning and game theory. A folk result in the field states that, in finite games, the empirical frequency of play under…

Reverse Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence-based regularization with respect to a fixed reference policy is widely used in modern reinforcement learning to preserve the desired traits of the reference policy and sometimes to promote…

We show for the first time, to our knowledge, that it is possible to reconcile in online learning in zero-sum games two seemingly contradictory objectives: vanishing time-average regret and non-vanishing step sizes. This phenomenon, that we…

Solving strategic games with huge action space is a critical yet under-explored topic in economics, operations research and artificial intelligence. This paper proposes new learning algorithms for solving two-player zero-sum normal-form…

We study the problem of minimizing swap regret in structured normal-form games. Players have a very large (potentially infinite) number of pure actions, but each action has an embedding into $d$-dimensional space and payoffs are given by…

Constrained Markov Decision Processes (CMDPs) are one of the common ways to model safe reinforcement learning problems, where constraint functions model the safety objectives. Lagrangian-based dual or primal-dual algorithms provide…

We study a novel setting in Online Markov Decision Processes (OMDPs) where the loss function is chosen by a non-oblivious strategic adversary who follows a no-external regret algorithm. In this setting, we first demonstrate that MDP-Expert,…

First-price auctions have recently gained significant traction in digital advertising markets, exemplified by Google's transition from second-price to first-price auctions. Unlike in second-price auctions, where bidding one's private…

In this paper we establish efficient and \emph{uncoupled} learning dynamics so that, when employed by all players in a general-sum multiplayer game, the \emph{swap regret} of each player after $T$ repetitions of the game is bounded by…

Online learning in arbitrary, and possibly adversarial, environments has been extensively studied in sequential decision-making, and it is closely connected to equilibrium computation in game theory. Most existing online learning algorithms…

We study various discrete nonlinear combinatorial optimization problems in an online learning framework. In the first part, we address the question of whether there are negative results showing that getting a vanishing (or even vanishing…

We show that Optimistic Hedge -- a common variant of multiplicative-weights-updates with recency bias -- attains ${\rm poly}(\log T)$ regret in multi-player general-sum games. In particular, when every player of the game uses Optimistic…

We study online learning settings in which experts act strategically to maximize their influence on the learning algorithm's predictions by potentially misreporting their beliefs about a sequence of binary events. Our goal is twofold.…

In this paper, we consider a sequential stochastic Stackelberg game with two players, a leader and a follower. The follower has access to the state of the system while the leader does not. Assuming that the players act in their respective…

We examine online safe multi-agent reinforcement learning using constrained Markov games in which agents compete by maximizing their expected total rewards under a constraint on expected total utilities. Our focus is confined to an episodic…

Constrained Markov decision processes (CMDPs) are a common way to model safety constraints in reinforcement learning. State-of-the-art methods for efficiently solving CMDPs are based on primal-dual algorithms. For these algorithms, all…