相关论文: Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals with Prop…

We consider the problem of locating a facility on a network, represented by a graph. A set of strategic agents have different ideal locations for the facility; the cost of an agent is the distance between its ideal location and the…

We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among strategic agents. We focus on settings wherein monetary transfers are not available and each agent's private valuation is a submodular function with binary marginals, i.e., the…

It is typically expected that if a mechanism is truthful, then the agents would, indeed, truthfully report their private information. But why would an agent believe that the mechanism is truthful? We wish to design truthful mechanisms,…

This work studies the problem of constructing a representative workload from a given input analytical query workload where the former serves as an approximation with guarantees of the latter. We discuss our work in the context of workload…

In participatory budgeting, communities collectively decide on the allocation of public tax dollars for local public projects. In this work, we consider the question of fairly aggregating the preferences of community members to determine an…

We study resource allocation in two-sided markets from a fundamental perspective and introduce a general modeling and algorithmic framework to effectively incorporate the complex and multidimensional aspects of fairness. Our main technical…

We design a Copula-based generic randomized truthful mechanism for scheduling on two unrelated machines with approximation ratio within $[1.5852, 1.58606]$, offering an improved upper bound for the two-machine case. Moreover, we provide an…

We consider the problem of budget feasible mechanism design proposed by Singer (2010), but in a Bayesian setting. A principal has a public value for hiring a subset of the agents and a budget, while the agents have private costs for being…

The fundamental assignment problem is in search of welfare maximization mechanisms to allocate items to agents when the private preferences over indivisible items are provided by self-interested agents. The mainstream mechanism…

Selecting prototypical examples from a source distribution to represent a target data distribution is a fundamental problem in machine learning. Existing subset selection methods often rely on implicit importance scores, which can be skewed…

We consider the minimum makespan problem for $n$ tasks and two unrelated parallel selfish machines. Let $R_n$ be the best approximation ratio of randomized monotone scale-free algorithms. This class contains the most efficient algorithms…

The challenge of identifying the best feasible arm within a fixed budget has attracted considerable interest in recent years. However, a notable gap remains in the literature: the exact exponential rate at which the error probability…

This paper introduces Bounded Fuzzy Possibilistic Method (BFPM) by addressing several issues that previous clustering/classification methods have not considered. In fuzzy clustering, object's membership values should sum to 1. Hence, any…

We consider the problem of allocating heterogeneous and indivisible goods among strategic agents, with preferences over subsets of goods, when there is no medium of exchange. This model captures the well studied problem of fair allocation…

This work gives the first natural non-utilitarian problems for which the trivial $n$ approximation via VCG mechanisms is the best possible. That is, no truthful mechanism can be better than $n$ approximate, where $n$ is the number of…

To better serve users' demands in mobile applications (e.g., navigation), mobile crowdsourcing platforms can iteratively align large language model (LLM)-generated content (e.g., AI-generated traffic condition predictions) with human…

We study the fundamental problem of selecting optimal features for model construction. This problem is computationally challenging on large datasets, even with the use of greedy algorithm variants. To address this challenge, we extend the…

We revisit the well-studied problem of budget-feasible procurement, where a buyer with a strict budget constraint seeks to acquire services from a group of strategic providers (the sellers). During the last decade, several strategyproof…

The approximation ratio has become one of the dominant measures in mechanism design problems. In light of analysis of algorithms, we define the \emph{smoothed approximation ratio} to compare the performance of the optimal mechanism and a…

We consider the problem of allocating $m$ indivisible chores among $n$ agents with possibly different weights, aiming for a solution that is both fair and efficient. Specifically, we focus on the classic fairness notion of proportionality…