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A good group reputation often facilitates more efficient synergistic teamwork in production activities. Here we translate this simple motivation into a reputation-based synergy and discounting mechanism in the public goods game.…
Indirect reciprocity maintains cooperation in stranger societies by mapping individual behaviors onto reputation signals via social norms. Existing theoretical frameworks assume static environments with constant resources and fixed payoff…
Social reputations facilitate cooperation: those who help others gain a good reputation, making them more likely to receive help themselves. But when people hold private views of one another, this cycle of indirect reciprocity breaks down,…
When a population is engaged in successive prisoner's dilemmas, indirect reciprocity through reputation fosters cooperation through the emergence of moral and action rules. A simplified model has recently been proposed where individuals…
Cooperation can be supported by indirect reciprocity via reputation.Thanks to gossip, reputations are built and circulated and humans can identify defectors and ostracise them. However, the evolutionary stability of gossip is allegedly…
Keeping a high reputation, by contributing to common efforts, plays a key role in explaining the evolution of collective cooperation among unrelated agents in a complex society. Nevertheless, it is not necessarily an individual feature, but…
To achieve common goals, we often use joint commitments. Our commitment helps us to coordinate with our partners and assures them that their cooperative efforts will benefit themselves. However, if one of us can exploit the other's…
Identifying mechanisms able to sustain costly cooperation among self-interested agents is a central problem across social and biological sciences. One possible solution is peer punishment: when agents have an opportunity to sanction…
Cooperation underlies many natural and artificial systems. While voluntary participation can sustain cooperation without informational assumptions, real interactions are rarely anonymous, leaving the joint effects of participation and…
A well known result states that stability criterion for matchings in two-sided markets doesn't ensure uniqueness. This opens the door for a moral question with regard to the optimal stable matching from a social point of view. Here, a new…
Indirect reciprocity in which players cooperate with unacquainted other players having good reputations is a mechanism for cooperation in relatively large populations subjected to social dilemma situations. When the population has group…
Cooperation for public goods poses a dilemma, where individuals are tempted to free ride on others' contributions. Classic solutions involve monitoring, reputation maintenance and costly incentives, but there are important collective…
Q-learning provides a standard reinforcement learning framework for studying cooperation by specifying how agents update action values from repeated local interactions outcomes. Although previous work has shown that reputation can promote…
The evolution of cooperation has remained an important problem in evolutionary theory and social sciences. In this regard, a curious question is why consistent cooperative and defective personalities exist and if they serve a role in the…
Many online marketplaces enjoy great success. Buyers and sellers in successful markets carry out cooperative transactions even if they do not know each other in advance and a moral hazard exists. An indispensable component that enables…
We study dynamic delegation with reputation feedback: a long-lived expert advises a sequence of implementers whose effort responds to current reputation, altering outcome informativeness and belief updates. We solve for a recursive,…
Understanding how cooperation emerges and persists is a central challenge in the evolutionary dynamics of social and biological systems. Most prior studies have examined cooperation through pairwise interactions, yet real-world interactions…
Stern-judging is one of the best-known assessment rules in indirect reciprocity. Indirect reciprocity is a fundamental mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. It relies on mutual monitoring and assessments, i.e., individuals judge,…
This is a comment on a recent review article about reputation and reciprocity as mechanisms promoting cooperation. I also discuss the necessary changes for the currently game-theory-based cooperation studies to become a complete theory of…
Each participant in peer-to-peer network prefers to free-ride on the contribution of other participants. Reputation based resource sharing is a way to control the free riding. Instead of classical game theory we use evolutionary game theory…