相关论文: The Dichotomous Affiliate Stable Matching Problem:…

We propose two solution concepts for matchings under preferences: robustness and near stability. The former strengthens while the latter relaxes the classic definition of stability by Gale and Shapley (1962). Informally speaking, robustness…

The classic two-sided many-to-one job matching model assumes that firms treat workers as substitutes and workers ignore colleagues when choosing where to work. Relaxing these assumptions may lead to nonexistence of stable matchings.…

We study a dynamic matching problem on a two-sided platform with unbalanced patience, in which long-lived supply accumulates over time with a unit waiting cost per period, while short-lived demand departs if not matched promptly. High- or…

Stability is crucial in matching markets, yet in many real-world settings - from hospital residency allocations to roommate assignments - full stability is either impossible to achieve or can come at the cost of leaving many agents…

This article presents the long-term behaviour analysis of Stochastic Diffusion Search (SDS), a distributed agent-based system for best-fit pattern matching. SDS operates by allocating simple agents into different regions of the search…

Suppose each of $n$ men and $n$ women is located at a point in a metric space. A woman ranks the men in order of their distance to her from closest to farthest, breaking ties at random. The men rank the women similarly. An interesting…

We thoroughly study a generalized version of the classic Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems where agents may share partners. We consider two prominent stability concepts: ordinal stability [Aharoni and Fleiner, Journal of…

There are growing concerns that algorithms, which increasingly make or influence important decisions pertaining to individuals, might produce outcomes that discriminate against protected groups. We study such fairness concerns in the…

A recently introduced restricted variant of the multidimensional stable roommate problem is the roommate diversity problem: each agent belongs to one of two types (e.g., red and blue), and the agents' preferences over the coalitions solely…

We study the stable matching problem in non-bipartite graphs with incomplete but strict preference lists, where the edges have weights and the goal is to compute a stable matching of minimum or maximum weight. This problem is known to be…

We study the problem of dynamic matching in heterogeneous networks, where agents are subject to compatibility restrictions and stochastic arrival and departure times. In particular, we consider networks with one type of easy-to-match agents…

The hiring problem is studied for general strategies based only on the relative ranking of the candidates; this includes some well known strategies studied before such as hiring above the median. We give general limit theorems for the…

The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) is the most widely accepted and used algorithm to match students, workers, or residents to colleges, firms or hospitals respectively. In this paper, we consider for the first time, the complexity of…

We study deviations by a group of agents in the three main types of matching markets: the house allocation, the marriage, and the roommates models. For a given instance, we call a matching $k$-stable if no other matching exists that is more…

We study the problem of finding solutions to the stable matching problem that are robust to errors in the input and we obtain a polynomial time algorithm for a special class of errors. In the process, we also initiate work on a new…

The standard two-sided and one-sided matching problems, and the closely related school choice problem, have been widely studied from an axiomatic viewpoint. A small number of algorithms dominate the literature. For two-sided matching, the…

We study the distortion of one-sided and two-sided matching problems on the line. In the one-sided case, $n$ agents need to be matched to $n$ items, and each agent's cost in a matching is their distance from the item they were matched to.…

We consider the stable matching problem (e.g. between doctors and hospitals) in a one-to-one matching setting, where preferences are drawn uniformly at random. It is known that when doctors propose and the number of doctors equals the…

We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided. Rather, each…

We study a sequential decision-making model where a set of items is repeatedly matched to the same set of agents over multiple rounds. The objective is to determine a sequence of matchings that either maximizes the utility of the least…