相关论文: Phragm\'en Rules for Degressive and Regressive Pro…

The rebellious voter model, introduced by Sturm and Swart (2008), is a variation of the standard, one-dimensional voter model, in which types that are locally in the minority have an advantage. It is related, both through duality and…

American democracy is currently heavily reliant on plurality in single-member districts, or PSMD, as a system of election. But public perceptions of fairness are often keyed to partisan proportionality, or the degree of congruence between…

Classical work on metric space based committee selection problem interprets distance as ``near is better''. In this work, motivated by real-life situations, we interpret distance as ``far is better''. Formally stated, we initiate the study…

In rank aggregation, the task is to aggregate multiple weighted input rankings into a single output ranking. While numerous methods, so-called social welfare functions (SWFs), have been suggested for this problem, all of the classical SWFs…

Selective regression allows abstention from prediction if the confidence to make an accurate prediction is not sufficient. In general, by allowing a reject option, one expects the performance of a regression model to increase at the cost of…

The voter model is a classical interacting particle system, modelling how global consensus is formed by local imitation. We analyse the time to consensus for a particular family of voter models when the underlying structure is a scale-free…

A method is given for quantitatively rating the social acceptance of different options which are the matter of a preferential vote. In contrast to a previous article, here the individual votes are allowed to be incomplete, that is, they…

In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumption that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders on the set of alternatives, we study the rules which satisfy suitable symmetries and obey the majority principle.…

Sequential voting rules have played a crucial role in shaping decisions within parliamentary and legislative frameworks. After observing that the existing sequential rules fail several fundamental axioms, Horan and Sprumont [2022] proposed…

The election methods introduced in 1894--1895 by Phragm\'en and Thiele, and their somewhat later versions for ordered (ranked) ballots, are discussed in detail. The paper includes definitions and examples and discussion of whether the…

The property of proportional representation in approval-based committee elections has appeared in the social choice literature for over a century, and is typically understood as avoiding the underrepresentation of minorities. However, we…

Winner selection by majority, in an election between two candidates, is the only rule compatible with democratic principles. Instead, when the candidates are three or more and the voters rank candidates in order of preference, there are no…

In party-approval multiwinner elections the goal is to allocate the seats of a fixed-size committee to parties based on the approval ballots of the voters over the parties. In particular, each voter can approve multiple parties and each…

In this paper, we experimentally compare major approval-based multiwinner voting rules. To this end, we define a measure of similarity between two equal-sized committees subject to a given election. Using synthetic elections coming from…

We propose the maximin support method, a novel extension of the D'Hondt apportionment method to approval-based multiwinner elections. The maximin support method is based on maximizing the support of the least supported elected candidate. It…

In many proportional parliamentary elections, electoral thresholds (typically 3-5%) are used to promote stability and governability by preventing the election of parties with very small representation. However, these thresholds often result…

We study two-stage committee elections where voters have dynamic preferences over candidates; at each stage, a committee is chosen under a given voting rule. We are interested in identifying a winning committee for the second stage that…

There has been much recent work on multiwinner voting systems. However, sometimes a committee is highly structured, and if we want to vote for such a committee, our voting method should be more structured as well. We consider committees…

We prove axiomatic characterizations of several important multiwinner rules within the class of approval-based committee choice rules. These are voting rules that return a set of (fixed-size) committees. In particular, we provide axiomatic…

We analyze properties of apportionment functions in context of the problem of allocating seats in the European Parliament. Necessary and sufficient conditions for apportionment functions are investigated. Some exemplary families of…