相关论文: A Taxonomy of Non-dictatorial Unidimensional Domai…

We study a class of preference domains that satisfies the familiar properties of minimal richness, diversity and no-restoration. We show that a specific preference restriction, hybridness, has been embedded in these domains so that the…

In the field of Judgment Aggrgation, a domain, that is a subset of a Cartesian power of $\{0,1\}$, is considered to reflect abstract rationality restrictions on vectors of two-valued judgments on a number of issues. We are interested in the…

An ordinal preference domain is a subset of preference orders that the voters are allowed to cast in an election. We introduce and study the notion of outer diversity of a domain and evaluate its value for a number of well-known structured…

We study a public decision problem in which a finite society selects a public-good level from a closed interval. Agents either have single-peaked preferences or are completely indifferent over the interval; the latter capture abstention or…

Let g be a strategy-proof rule on the domain NP of profiles where no alternative Pareto-dominates any other. Then we establish a result with a Gibbard-Satterthwaite flavor: g is dictatorial if its range contains at least three alternatives.

We introduce the notion of a multidimensional hybrid preference domain on a (finite) set of alternatives that is a Cartesian product of finitely many components. We demonstrate that in a model of public goods provision, multidimensional…

In the problem of fully allocating a social endowment of perfectly divisible commodities among a group of agents with multidimensional single-peaked preferences, we study strategy-proof rules that are not Pareto-dominated by other…

One of the central economic paradigms in multi-agent systems is that agents should not be better off by acting dishonestly. In the context of collective decision-making, this axiom is known as strategyproofness and turns out to be rather…

This paper characterizes the single-peaked domain on a tree via the strategy-proofness of extreme rules defined on that tree. For any tree, these rules are unanimous and anonymous on any preference domain. In particular, we show that they…

In some preference aggregation scenarios, voters' preferences are highly structured: e.g., the set of candidates may have one-dimensional structure (so that voters' preferences are single-peaked) or be described by a binary decision tree…

Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked, single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the structure makes it easier to reason about preferences, and…

We investigate preference domains under which every unanimous and locally strategy-proof social choice function (scf) satisfies dictatorship. We identify a condition on domains called connected with distinct neighbours which is necessary…

This paper introduces a novel binary stability property for voting rules-called binary self-selectivity-by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself in pairwise elections will choose not to do so. In…

We investigate when non-dictatorial aggregation is possible from an algorithmic perspective, where non-dictatorial aggregation means that the votes cast by the members of a society can be aggregated in such a way that there is no single…

Many hard computational social choice problems are known to become tractable when voters' preferences belong to a restricted domain, such as those of single-peaked or single-crossing preferences. However, to date, all algorithmic results of…

We study the setting of committee elections, where a group of individuals needs to collectively select a given size subset of available objects. This model is relevant for a number of real-life scenarios including political elections,…

Let g be a strategy-proof rule on the domain NP of profiles where no alternative Pareto-dominates any other and let g have range S on NP. We complete the proof of a Gibbard-Satterthwaite result - if S contains more than two elements, then g…

Several of the classical results in social choice theory demonstrate that in order for many voting systems to be well-behaved the set domain of individual preferences must satisfy some kind of restriction, such as being single-peaked on a…

We establish that all strategy-proof social choice rules in strict preference domains follow necessarily a two-step procedure. In the first step, agents are asked to reveal some specific information about their preferences. Afterwards, a…

The celebrated Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem states that any surjective social choice function which is defined over the universal domain of preferences and is strategy-proof must be dictatorial. Aswal, Chatterji and Sen generalize the…