相关论文: On the Equivalence of Two Competing Affirmative Ac…

This paper analyzes the asymptotic performance of two popular affirmative action policies, majority quota and minority reserve, under the immediate acceptance mechanism (IAM) and the top trading cycles mechanism (TTCM) in the contest of…

We study a school choice problem under affirmative action policies where authorities reserve a certain fraction of the slots at each school for specific student groups, and where students have preferences not only over the schools they are…

This study considers a model where schools may have multiple priority orders on students, which may be inconsistent with each other. For example, in school choice systems, since the sibling priority and the walk zone priority coexist, the…

A vast majority of the school choice literature focuses on designing mechanisms to simultaneously assign students to many schools, and employs a "make it up as you go along" approach when it comes to each school's admissions policy. An…

We consider the problem of designing affirmative action policies for selecting the top-k candidates from a pool of applicants. We assume that for each candidate we have socio-demographic attributes and a series of variables that serve as…

We design two mechanisms that ensure that the majority preferred option wins in all equilibria. The first one is a simultaneous game where agents choose other agents to cooperate with on top of the vote for an alternative, thus overcoming…

We study a game theoretic model of standardized testing for college admissions. Students are of two types; High and Low. There is a college that would like to admit the High type students. Students take a potentially costly standardized…

Critical decisions in hiring, college admissions, and credit lending are guided by predictions made in the presence of uncertainty. While uncertainty imparts errors across all demographic groups, this paper shows that the types of errors…

In many empirical studies of a large two-sided matching market (such as in a college admissions problem), the researcher performs statistical inference under the assumption that they observe a random sample from a large matching market. In…

School choice is the two-sided matching market where students (on one side) are to be matched with schools (on the other side) based on their mutual preferences. The classical algorithm to solve this problem is the celebrated deferred…

We study the problem of selecting the top-k candidates from a pool of applicants, where each candidate is associated with a score indicating his/her aptitude. Depending on the specific scenario, such as job search or college admissions,…

This survey article provides insights regarding the future of affirmative action by analyzing the implementation methods and the empirical evidence on the use of placement quotas in the Brazilian higher education system. All federal…

The over-and-above choice rule is the prominent selection procedure to implement affirmative action. In India, it is legally mandated to allocate public school seats and government job positions. This paper presents an axiomatic…

We study conditions for the existence of stable and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students' preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that "equivalence", properly defined, to a…

This article offers a critical response to the preprint by Matheus et al. (2025), which evaluates the academic performance of students admitted through different entry routes at Sao Paulo State University. Although the dataset compiled by…

I study the relationship between diversity preferences and the choice rules implemented by institutions, with a particular focus on the affirmative action policies. I characterize the choice rules that can be rationalized by diversity…

Two-sided matching markets have long existed to pair agents in the absence of regulated exchanges. A common example is school choice, where a matching mechanism uses student and school preferences to assign students to schools. In such…

Prevailing methods of course allocation at undergraduate institutions involve reserving seats to give priority to designated groups of students. We introduce a competitive equilibrium-based mechanism that assigns course seats using student…

In many reserve-based affirmative action systems, admission cutoffs are publicly disclosed to enable students to verify whether reserved seats are correctly assigned. We introduce a verifiability criterion: each student must be able to…

In this paper, we study university admissions under a centralized system that uses grades and standardized test scores to match applicants to university programs. We consider affirmative action policies that seek to increase the number of…