Diversity Preferences, Affirmative Action and Choice Rules
Theoretical Economics
2023-10-24 v1
Abstract
I study the relationship between diversity preferences and the choice rules implemented by institutions, with a particular focus on the affirmative action policies. I characterize the choice rules that can be rationalized by diversity preferences and demonstrate that the recently rescinded affirmative action mechanism used to allocate government positions in India cannot be rationalized. I show that if institutions evaluate diversity without considering intersectionality of identities, their choices cannot satisfy the crucial substitutes condition. I characterize choice rules that satisfy the substitutes condition and are rationalizable by preferences that are separable in diversity and match quality domains.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2310.14442,
title = {Diversity Preferences, Affirmative Action and Choice Rules},
author = {Oguzhan Celebi},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.14442},
year = {2023}
}