相关论文: Constrained School Choice with Incomplete Informat…
The school choice mechanism design problem focuses on assignment mechanisms matching students to public schools in a given school district. The well-known Gale Shapley Student Optimal Stable Matching Mechanism (SOSM) is the most efficient…
Two-sided matching markets have long existed to pair agents in the absence of regulated exchanges. A common example is school choice, where a matching mechanism uses student and school preferences to assign students to schools. In such…
This study considers a model where schools may have multiple priority orders on students, which may be inconsistent with each other. For example, in school choice systems, since the sibling priority and the walk zone priority coexist, the…
We present our experimental results of simulating the school choice problem which deals with the assignment of students to schools based on each group's complete preference list for the other group using two algorithms: Boston mechanism and…
Many countries around the world, including Korea, use the school choice lottery system. However, this method has a problem in that many students are assigned to less-preferred schools based on the lottery results. In addition, the task of…
The standard two-sided and one-sided matching problems, and the closely related school choice problem, have been widely studied from an axiomatic viewpoint. A small number of algorithms dominate the literature. For two-sided matching, the…
Two-sided matching markets describe a large class of problems wherein participants from one side of the market must be matched to those from the other side according to their preferences. In many real-world applications (e.g. content…
This paper proposes a novel school choice system where schools are grouped into hierarchical bundles and offered to students as options for preference reports. By listing a bundle, a student seeks admission to any school within it without…
We examine a controlled school choice model where students are categorized into different types, and the distribution of these types within a school influences its priority structure. This study provides a general framework that integrates…
The school choice problem concerns the design and implementation of matching mechanisms that produce school assignments for students within a given public school district. Previously considered criteria for evaluating proposed mechanisms…
The school choice problem concerns the design and implementation of matching mechanisms that produce school assignments for students within a given public school district. In this note we define a simple student-optimal criterion that is…
We develop inference for a two-sided matching model where the characteristics of agents on one side of the market are endogenous due to pre-matching investments. The model can be used to measure the impact of frictions in labour markets…
In school choice, students make decisions based on their expectations of particular schools' suitability, and the decision to gather information about schools is influenced by the acceptance odds determined by the mechanism in place. We…
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…
In considering the college admissions problem, almost fifty years ago, Gale and Shapley came up with a simple abstraction based on preferences of students and colleges. They introduced the concept of stability and optimality; and proposed…
We study a many-to-one matching model inspired by school choice, where schools evaluate applicants using multiple rankings rather than a single priority order. We model each school's evaluation with social choice criteria to reflect the…
Matching algorithms have demonstrated great success in several practical applications, but they often require centralized coordination and plentiful information. In many modern online marketplaces, agents must independently seek out and…
In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…
Student placements under diversity constraints are a common practice globally. This paper addresses the selection of students by a single school under a \emph{one-to-one convention}, where students can belong to multiple types but are…
A classic trade-off that school districts face when deciding which matching algorithm to use is that it is not possible to always respect both priorities and preferences. The student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) respects…