作为单边匹配问题的学校选择：基数效用与优化
最优化与控制
2013-05-01 v2 计算机科学与博弈论
摘要
学校选择问题涉及设计和实施匹配机制，以在指定的公立学区内为学生分配学校。此前用于评估提议机制的标准，如稳定性、策略证明性和帕累托效率，并不总能转化为理想的学生分配结果。在本文中，我们探索了一类专注于学生偏好的单边基数效用最大化匹配机制。我们将一种著名的组合优化技术（匈牙利算法）适配为这类匹配机制的核心。我们发现，虽然此类机制可以经过调整以满足学校选择文献中以往任何已采用机制均未满足的理想标准，但它们不具备策略证明性。我们在文章最后讨论了我们方法的实际意义和局限性。
引用
@article{arxiv.1304.7413,
title = {School Choice as a One-Sided Matching Problem: Cardinal Utilities and Optimization},
author = {Sinan Aksoy and Alexander Adam Azzam and Chaya Coppersmith and Julie Glass and Gizem Karaali and Xueying Zhao and Xinjing Zhu},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1304.7413},
year = {2013}
}
备注
This work evolved from an earlier version of arXiv:1010.2312 (v1) and has textual overlaps with that version in the introduction / background. We cite the final version of that paper (v2, published as part of the ISAIM 2012 Proceedings) and use some of its results here. Different titles and separate submissions indicate the substantially different theoretical emphases of the two papers. (4/30/13)