相关论文: Evolutionary Vaccination Games with premature vacc…
The outbreak of mutant strains and vaccination behaviors have been the focus of recent epidemiological research, but most existing epidemic models failed to simultaneously capture viral mutation and consider the complexity and behavioral…
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an important solution concept in game theory which has been applied frequently to biological models. Informally an ESS is a strategy that if followed by the population cannot be taken over by a…
Opposition to vaccination has long been a non-negligible public health phenomenon resulted from people's varied perceptions toward vaccination (e.g., vaccine-phobia). This paper investigates the voluntary vaccination behavior of a…
Vaccinations are an important tool in the prevention of disease. Vaccinations are generally voluntary for each member of a population and vaccination decisions are influenced by individual risk perceptions and contact structures within…
We study decentralized protection strategies against Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemics on networks. We consider a population game framework where nodes choose whether or not to vaccinate themselves, and the epidemic risk is…
We examine here the effects of recurrent vaccination and waning immunity on the establishment of an endemic equilibrium in a population. An individual-based model that incorporates memory effects for transmission rate during infection and…
Vaccination is widely recognised as one of the most effective forms of public health interventions. Individuals decisions regarding vaccination creates a complex social dilemma between individual and collective interests, where each…
Vaccination games in higher-order settings remain underexplored, despite their importance in shaping opinions and collective decisions. Here, we introduce a parsimonious behavioral-epidemiological model to evaluate how peer reinforcement…
Voluntary vaccination is effective to prevent infectious diseases from spreading. Both vaccination behavior and cognition of the vaccination risk play important roles in individual vaccination decision making. However, it is not clear how…
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is the defining concept of evolutionary game theory. It has a fairly unanimously accepted definition for the case of symmetric games which are played in a homogeneous population where all individuals are…
In contemporary society, social networks accelerate decision dynamics causing a rapid switch of opinions in a number of fields, including the prevention of infectious diseases by means of vaccines. This means that opinion dynamics can…
Voluntary vaccination is essential to protect oneself from infection and suppress the spread of infectious diseases. Voluntary vaccination behavior is influenced by factors such as age and interaction patterns. Differences in health…
This paper investigates the effects of vaccination on the dynamics of infectious disease, which is spreading in a population concurrently with awareness. The model considers contributions to the overall awareness from a global information…
The idea of evolutionarily stable state (ESS) of a population is a cornerstone of evolutionary game theory; moreover, it coincides with the game-theoretic concept of Nash equilibrium. Such a state corresponds to a strategy adopted by the…
The study of evolutionary games with pairwise local interactions has been of interest to many different disciplines. Also local interactions with multiple opponents had been considered, although always for a fixed amount of players. In many…
Epidemics have shaped human history, often with devastating consequences, motivating the development of mathematical models to understand and control their dynamics. Among the many aspects of epidemic behavior, the conditions that lead to…
In this paper, we investigate game-theoretic strategies for containing spreading processes on large-scale networks. Specifically, we consider the class of networked susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) epidemics where a large population…
We develop a mechanistic model that classifies individuals both in terms of epidemiological status (SIR) and vaccination attitude (willing or unwilling), with the goal of discovering how disease spread is influenced by changing opinions…
Heterogeneity of population is a key factor in modeling the transmission of disease among the population and has huge impact on the outcome of the transmission. In order to investigate the decision making process in the heterogeneous mixing…
We consider the simple epidemiological SIS model for a general heterogeneous population introduced by Lajmanovich and Yorke (1976) in finite dimension, and its infinite dimensional generalization we introduced in previous works. In this…