相关论文: Facility Location Games with Ordinal Preferences

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure…

An important feature of many real world facility location problems are capacity limits on the facilities. We show here how capacity constraints make it harder to design strategy proof mechanisms for facility location, but…

We study mechanism design with predictions for the obnoxious facility location problem. We present deterministic strategyproof mechanisms that display tradeoffs between robustness and consistency on segments, squares, circles and trees. All…

We consider the problem of locating a public facility on a line, where a set of $n$ strategic agents report their \emph{locations} and a mechanism determines, either deterministically or randomly, the location of the facility. Game…

We consider preference communication in two-player multi-objective normal-form games. In such games, the payoffs resulting from joint actions are vector-valued. Taking a utility-based approach, we assume there exists a utility function for…

We study the problem of mechanism design for allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with private preferences on items. We are interested in such a mechanism that is strategyproof (where agents' best strategy is to report their…

We study a constrained distributed heterogeneous two-facility location problem, where a set of agents with private locations on the real line are divided into disjoint groups. The constraint means that the facilities can only be built in a…

This paper studies a practical regional demand continuous multifacility location problems whose main goal is to locate a given number of services and entry points in each region to distribute certain products to the users at minimum…

We study a class of location games where players want to attract as many resources as possible and pay a cost when deviating from an exogenous reference location. This class of games includes political competitions between policy-interested…

We study a variation of facility location problems (FLPs) that aims to improve the accessibility of agents to the facility within the context of mechanism design without money. In such a variation, agents have preferences on the ideal…

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality,…

In this paper, we introduce a new variant of the $p$-median facility location problem in which it is assumed that the exact location of the potential facilities is unknown. Instead, each of the facilities must be located in a region around…

Addressing the question of how to achieve optimal decision-making under risk and uncertainty is crucial for enhancing the capabilities of artificial agents that collaborate with or support humans. In this work, we address this question in…

We address the problem of strategyproof (SP) facility location mechanisms on discrete trees. Our main result is a full characterization of onto and SP mechanisms. In particular, we prove that when a single agent significantly affects the…

Modeling the preferences of agents over a set of alternatives is a principal concern in many areas. The dominant approach has been to find a single reward/utility function with the property that alternatives yielding higher rewards are…

A principal must allocate a set of heterogeneous tasks (or objects) among multiple agents. The principal has preferences over the allocation. Each agent has preferences over which tasks they are assigned, which are their private…

When allocating indivisible objects via lottery, planners often use ordinal mechanisms, which elicit agents' rankings of objects rather than their full preferences over lotteries. In such an ordinal informational environment, planners…

We provide nearly optimal algorithms for online facility location (OFL) with predictions. In OFL, $n$ demand points arrive in order and the algorithm must irrevocably assign each demand point to an open facility upon its arrival. The…

We consider the problem of locating a facility on a network, represented by a graph. A set of strategic agents have different ideal locations for the facility; the cost of an agent is the distance between its ideal location and the…

We consider games played on finite graphs, whose goal is to obtain a trace belonging to a given set of winning traces. We focus on those states from which Player 1 cannot force a win. We explore and compare several criteria for establishing…