相关论文: A Phase Transition in Large Network Games

This paper explores aggregative games in a network of general linear systems subject to external disturbances. To deal with external disturbances, distributed strategy-updating rules based on internal model are proposed for the case with…

Contemporary applications of machine learning in two-team e-sports and the superior expressivity of multi-agent generative adversarial networks raise important and overlooked theoretical questions regarding optimization in two-team games.…

In this paper, we present a game-theoretic model describing voluntary social distancing during the spread of an epidemic. The payoffs of the agents depend on the social distancing they practice and on the probability of getting infected. We…

In this paper, we investigate the dynamics of coordinating and anti-coordinating agents in a coevolutionary model for actions and opinions. In the model, the individuals of a population interact on a two-layer network, sharing their…

The connectivity of individual neurons of large neural networks determine both the steady state activity of the network and its answer to external stimulus. Highly diluted random networks have zero activity. We show that increasing the…

This paper investigates a distributed robust Nash Equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for second-order players subject to external disturbances and uncertain dynamics while communicating via semi-Markov switching topologies. To accommodate the…

We introduce NLK, a model that connects the Nash equilibrium (NE) and Level-K. It allows a player in a game to believe that her opponent may be either less or as sophisticated as, she is, a view supported in psychology. We apply NLK to data…

Dynamical phase transitions (DPTs) characterize critical changes in system behavior occurring at finite times, providing a lens to study nonequilibrium phenomena beyond conventional equilibrium physics. While extensively studied in quantum…

We study pure Nash equilibria in infinite-duration games on graphs, with partial visibility of actions but communication (based on a graph) among the players. We show that a simple communication mechanism consisting in reporting the…

Deception plays a critical role in many interactions in communication and network security. Game-theoretic models called "cheap talk signaling games" capture the dynamic and information asymmetric nature of deceptive interactions. But…

We introduce a simple model of a growing system with $m$ competing communities. The model corresponds to the phenomenon of defeats suffered by social groups living in isolation. A nonequilibrium phase transition is observed when at critical…

This paper considers a networked aggregative game (NAG) where the players are distributed over a communication network. By only communicating with a subset of players, the goal of each player in the NAG is to minimize an individual cost…

In this paper we study the phase transitions of different types of Random Boolean networks. These differ in their updating scheme: synchronous, semi-synchronous, or asynchronous, and deterministic or non-deterministic. It has been shown…

Mean field games are concerned with the limit of large-population stochastic differential games where the agents interact through their empirical distribution. In the classical setting, the number of players is large but fixed throughout…

We study network games in which players choose both the partners with whom they associate and an action level (e.g., effort) that creates spillovers for those partners. We introduce a framework and two solution concepts, extending standard…

We broaden the basis of non-cooperative game theory by considering miscoordination on a solution concept. For any solution concept, we extend the solution set of a strategic-form game to a transition set. This set contains profiles where…

In this paper we extend the investigation of cooperation in some classical evolutionary games on populations were the network of interactions among individuals is of the scale-free type. We show that the update rule, the payoff computation…

Concurrent multi-player games with $\omega$-regular objectives are a standard model for systems that consist of several interacting components, each with its own objective. The standard solution concept for such games is Nash Equilibrium,…

We study strategic interaction in linear-quadratic network games where agents act on subjective, misspecified models of their environment. Agents observe noisy aggregate signals generated by local network externalities and interpret them…

A repeated network game where agents have quadratic utilities that depend on information externalities -- an unknown underlying state -- as well as payoff externalities -- the actions of all other agents in the network -- is considered.…