相关论文: Verified Double Sided Auctions for Financial Marke…
Development of formal proofs of correctness of programs can increase actual and perceived reliability and facilitate better understanding of program specifications and their underlying assumptions. Tools supporting such development have…
Cody & Waite argument reduction technique works perfectly for reasonably large arguments but as the input grows there are no bit left to approximate the constant with enough accuracy. Under mild assumptions, we show that the result computed…
Since 2019, most ad exchanges and sell-side platforms (SSPs), in the online advertising industry, shifted from second to first price auctions. Due to the fundamental difference between these auctions, demand-side platforms (DSPs) have had…
Matching problems have been widely studied in the research community, especially Ad-Auctions with many applications ranging from network design to advertising. Following the various advancements in machine learning, one natural question is…
This paper gives a theoretical model for design and analysis of mechanisms for online marketplaces where a bidding dashboard enables the bid-optimization of long-lived agents. We assume that a good allocation algorithm exists when given the…
We design simple mechanisms to approximate the Gains from Trade (GFT) in two-sided markets with multiple unit-supply sellers and multiple unit-demand buyers. A classical impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite showed that even…
A digital goods auction is a type of auction where potential buyers bid the maximal price that they are willing to pay for a certain item, which a seller can produce at a negligible cost and in unlimited quantity. To maximise her benefits,…
This paper deals with the alternative mathematical modeling of the two-side platform. Two-sided platforms are specific multi-sided platforms that bring together two distinct groups of a model. The stochastic modeling by adapting various…
Our main contribution is a strongly polynomial algorithm for computing an equilibrium for the Arctic Auction, which is the quasi-linear extension of the linear Fisher market model. We build directly on Orlin's strongly polynomial algorithm…
We introduce a new model for two-sided matching which allows us to borrow popular fairness notions from the fair division literature such as envy-freeness up to one good and maximin share guarantee. In our model, each agent is matched to…
A trading system is said to be {robust} if it generates a robust return regardless of market direction. To this end, a consistently positive expected trading gain is often used as a robustness metric for a trading system. In this paper, we…
With the continuous expansion of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, edge computing mode has emerged in recent years to overcome the shortcomings of traditional cloud computing mode, such as high delay, network congestion, and large resource…
Threshold secret sharing schemes do not prevent any malicious behavior of the dealer or shareholders and so we need verifiable secret sharing, to detect and identify the cheaters, to achieve fair reconstruction of a secret. The problem of…
We extend variational quantum optimization algorithms for Quadratic Unconstrained Binary Optimization problems to the class of Mixed Binary Optimization problems. This allows us to combine binary decision variables with continuous decision…
We study a basic auction design problem with online supply. There are two unit-demand bidders and two types of items. The first item type will arrive first for sure, and the second item type may or may not arrive. The auctioneer has to…
As commerce shifts to digital marketplaces, platforms increasingly monetize traffic through Sponsored Shopping auctions. Unlike classic ``Sponsored Search", where an advertiser typically bids for a single link, these settings involve…
Most of the work in the auction design literature assumes that bidders behave rationally based on the information available for every individual auction, and the revelation principle enables designers to restrict their efforts to incentive…
We consider the sale of a single item to multiple buyers by a revenue-maximizing seller. Recent work of Akbarpour and Li formalizes \emph{credibility} as an auction desideratum, and prove that the only optimal, credible, strategyproof…
Recent years have witnessed the proposals aiming at enabling Vertical, two-sided markets with a Single Marketplace (or exchange) (VSMs) for computing and data resources/services (products) offerings in a multi-cloud and crowdsourced…
In traditional public blockchain networks, transaction fees are only allocated to full nodes (i.e., miners). However, the lack of relay rewards reduces the willingness of light nodes to relay transactions, especially in the…