相关论文: Symbiotic behaviour in the Public Goods game with …
Inspired by the fact that people have diverse propensities to punish wrongdoers, we study a spatial public goods game with defectors and different types of punishing cooperators. During the game, cooperators punish defectors with…
Economic experiments have shown that punishment can increase public goods game contributions over time. However, the effectiveness of punishment is challenged by second-order freeriding and antisocial punishment. The latter implies that…
Empirical studies have shown that individuals' behaviors are largely influenced by social conformity, including punishment. However, a coevolutionary theoretical framework that takes into account effects of conformity on individuals'…
A large body of empirical evidence suggests that humans are willing to engage in costly punishment of defectors in public goods games. Based on such pieces of evidence, it is suggested that punishment serves an important role in promoting…
We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with four competing strategies: cooperators, defectors, punishing cooperators, and punishing defectors. To explore the robustness of the cooperation-promoting effect of…
We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games where, besides the classical strategies of cooperation (C) and defection (D), we consider punishing cooperators (PC) or punishing defectors (PD) as an additional strategy.…
Collective actions, from city marathons to labor strikes, are often mass-driven and subject to the snowball effect. Motivated by this, we study evolutionary advantages of conditional punishment in the spatial public goods game. Unlike…
Situations where individuals have to contribute to joint efforts or share scarce resources are ubiquitous. Yet, without proper mechanisms to ensure cooperation, the evolutionary pressure to maximize individual success tends to create a…
We study the evolution of cooperation in public goods games on the square lattice, focusing on the effects that are brought about by different sizes of groups where individuals collect their payoffs and search for potential strategy donors.…
The fact that individuals will most likely behave differently in different situations begets the introduction of conditional strategies. Inspired by this, we study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game, where besides…
The promise of punishment and reward in promoting public cooperation is debatable. While punishment is traditionally considered more successful than reward, the fact that the cost of punishment frequently fails to offset gains from enhanced…
Cooperation in evolutionary biology means paying a cost, c, to enjoy benefits, b. A defector is one who does not pay any cost but enjoys the benefits of cooperators. Human societies, especially, have evolved a strategy to discourage…
Cooperative behaviour has been extensively studied as a choice between cooperation and defection. However, the possibility to not participate is also frequently available. This type of problem can be studied through the optional public…
Societies consisting of cooperative individuals seem to require for their continuing success that defectors be policed. The precise connection between punishers and benefits, population structure, and division of labour, however, remains…
The emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior is a fascinating topic in evolutionary biology and social science. The public goods game (PGG) is a paradigm for exploring cooperative behavior. In PGG, the total resulting payoff is…
Punishment and partner switching are two well-studied mechanisms that support the evolution of cooperation. Observation of human behaviour suggests that the extent to which punishment is adopted depends on the usage of alternative…
Tolerance implies enduring trying circumstances with a fair and objective attitude. To determine whether evolutionary advantages might be stemming from diverse levels of tolerance in a population, we study a spatial public goods game, where…
The evolution of cooperation has been a perennial problem for evolutionary biology because cooperation is undermined by selfish cheaters (or "free riders") that profit from cooperators but do not invest any resources themselves. In a purely…
Cooperators that refuse to participate in sanctioning defectors create the second-order free-rider problem. Such cooperators will not be punished because they contribute to the public good, but they also eschew the costs associated with…
The evolution of cooperation has been a perennial problem in evolutionary biology because cooperation can be undermined by selfish cheaters who gain an advantage in the short run, while compromising the long-term viability of the…