相关论文: Computing Equilibria of Prediction Markets via Per…

A description of static equilibria in the noisy binary choice (Ising) game on complete and random graphs resulting from maximisation of the likelihood of system configurations is presented. An equivalence of such likelihood equilibria to…

We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game-theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered…

We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods in a way that is fair, using one of the leading market mechanisms in economics: the competitive equilibrium from equal incomes. Focusing on two major classes of valuations, namely…

$S$ equilibrium synthesizes a century of game-theoretic modeling. $S$-beliefs determine choices as in the refinement literature and level-$k$, without anchoring on Nash equilibrium or imposing ad hoc belief formation. $S$-choices allow for…

The task of computing approximate Nash equilibria in large zero-sum extensive-form games has received a tremendous amount of attention due mainly to the Annual Computer Poker Competition. Immediately after its inception, two competing and…

Classical Bayesian persuasion studies how a sender influences receivers through carefully designed signaling policies within a single strategic interaction. In many real-world environments, such interactions are repeated across multiple…

We investigate the problem of learning an equilibrium in a generalized two-sided matching market, where agents can adaptively choose their actions based on their assigned matches. Specifically, we consider a setting in which matched agents…

The recent explosion in the amount and dimensionality of data has exacerbated the need of trading off computational and statistical efficiency carefully, so that inference is both tractable and meaningful. We propose a framework that…

Observable games are game situations that reach one of possibly many Nash equilibria. Before an instance of the game starts, an external observer does not know, a priori, what is the exact profile of actions that will occur; thus, he…

This paper relaxes the common prior assumption in the public and private information game of Morris and Shin (2000, 2004). For the generalized game, where the agent's prior expectations are heterogenous, it derives a sharp condition for the…

Prediction markets are long known for prediction accuracy. This study systematically explores the fundamental properties of prediction markets, addressing questions about their information aggregation process and the factors contributing to…

As the amount of economic and other data generated worldwide increases vastly, a challenge for future generations of econometricians will be to master efficient algorithms for inference in empirical models with large information sets. This…

Forecasting, to estimate future events, is crucial for business and decision-making. This paper proposes QxEAI, a methodology that produces a probabilistic forecast that utilizes a quantum-like evolutionary algorithm based on training a…

We present a prototype hybrid prediction market and demonstrate the avenue it represents for meaningful human-AI collaboration. We build on prior work proposing artificial prediction markets as a novel machine-learning algorithm. In an…

Boolean games are a succinct representation of strategic games wherein a player seeks to satisfy a formula of propositional logic by selecting a truth assignment to a set of propositional variables under his control. The framework has…

Although production is an integral part of the Arrow-Debreu market model, most of the work in theoretical computer science has so far concentrated on markets without production, i.e., the exchange economy. This paper takes a significant…

Prior work has investigated variations of prediction markets that preserve participants' (differential) privacy, which formed the basis of useful mechanisms for purchasing data for machine learning objectives. Such markets required…

The paper studies information markets concerning single events from an epistemic social choice perspective. Within the classical Condorcet error model for collective binary decisions, we establish equivalence results between elections and…

We investigate Bayesian predictive inference for finite population quantities when there are unequal probabilities of selection. Only limited information about the sample design is available; i.e., only the first-order selection…

This paper is the continuation of "Pricing with coherent risk" and deals with further applications of coherent risk measures to problems of finance. First, we study the optimization problem. Three forms of this problem are considered.…