相关论文: Computing Equilibria of Prediction Markets via Per…

We generalize the seminal framework of Kyle (1985) to a many-asset setting, bridging the gap between informed-trading theory and modern trading practices. Specifically, we formulate an infinite-dimensional Bayesian trading game in which the…

This paper examines strategic trading under incomplete information, where firms lack full knowledge of key aspects of their competitors' trading strategies such as target sizes and market impact models. We extend previous work on…

We compute equilibrium strategies in multi-stage games with continuous signal and action spaces as they are widely used in the management sciences and economics. Examples include sequential sales via auctions, multi-stage elimination…

The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken…

Sensitivity forecasts inform the design of experiments and the direction of theoretical efforts. To arrive at representative results, Bayesian forecasts should marginalize their conclusions over uncertain parameters and noise realizations…

In this paper I empirically investigate prediction markets for binary options. Advocates of prediction markets have suggested that asset prices are consistent estimators of the "true" probability of a state of the world being realized. I…

In lowest unique bid auctions, $N$ players bid for an item. The winner is whoever places the \emph{lowest} bid, provided that it is also unique. We use a grand canonical approach to derive an analytical expression for the equilibrium…

In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…

In many areas of industry and society, e.g., energy, healthcare, logistics, agents collect vast amounts of data that they deem proprietary. These data owners extract predictive information of varying quality and relevance from data…

Collusion in market pricing is a concept associated with human actions to raise market prices through artificially limited supply. Recently, the idea of algorithmic collusion was put forward, where the human action in the pricing process is…

We tackle a fundamental problem in empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA), that of learning equilibria of simulation-based games. Such games cannot be described in analytical form; instead, a black-box simulator can be queried to obtain…

We consider the computational complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in first-price auctions, where the bidders' values for the item are drawn from a general (possibly correlated) joint distribution. We show that when the values and…

A prediction market is a useful means of aggregating information about a future event. To function, the market needs a trusted entity who will verify the true outcome in the end. Motivated by the recent introduction of decentralized…

Normal-form two-player games are categorized by players into K analogy classes so as to minimize the prediction error about the behavior of the opponent. This results in Clustered Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibria in which strategies are…

Matching algorithms have demonstrated great success in several practical applications, but they often require centralized coordination and plentiful information. In many modern online marketplaces, agents must independently seek out and…

In decision-dependent games, multiple players optimize their decisions under a data distribution that shifts with their joint actions, creating complex dynamics in applications like market pricing. A practical consequence of these dynamics…

Algorithms for equilibrium computation generally make no attempt to ensure that the computed strategies are understandable by humans. For instance the strategies for the strongest poker agents are represented as massive binary files. In…

In a satisficing equilibrium each agent $i$ plays one of her top $k_i$ actions in response to the actions of the other agents. Our concept unifies models of bounded rationality and yields predictions that differ from canonical solution…

We study a game between two firms in which each provide a service based on machine learning. The firms are presented with the opportunity to purchase a new corpus of data, which will allow them to potentially improve the quality of their…

The sequential equilibrium is a standard solution concept for extensive-form games with imperfect information that includes an explicit representation of the players' beliefs. An assessment consisting of a strategy and a belief is a…