相关论文: Competitive Allocation of a Mixed Manna

We study the problem of allocating divisible bads (chores) among multiple agents with additive utilities when monetary transfers are not allowed. The competitive rule is known for its remarkable fairness and efficiency properties in the…

PPAD refers to a class of computational problems for which solutions are guaranteed to exist due to a specific combinatorial principle. The most well-known such problem is that of computing a Nash equilibrium of a game. Other examples…

We consider fair allocation of indivisible items under additive utilities. When the utilities can be negative, the existence and complexity of an allocation that satisfies Pareto optimality and proportionality up to one item (PROP1) is an…

Single minded agents have strict preferences, in which a bundle is acceptable only if it meets a certain demand. Such preferences arise naturally in scenarios such as allocating computational resources among users, where the goal is to…

We analyze the run-time complexity of computing allocations that are both fair and maximize the utilitarian social welfare, defined as the sum of agents' utilities. We focus on two tractable fairness concepts: envy-freeness up to one item…

The stable allocation problem is a many-to-many generalization of the well-known stable marriage problem, where we seek a bipartite assignment between, say, jobs (of varying sizes) and machines (of varying capacities) that is "stable" based…

We study the computational complexity of the problem of computing local min-max equilibria of games with a nonconvex-nonconcave utility function $f$. From the work of Daskalakis, Skoulakis, and Zampetakis [DSZ21], this problem was known to…

We study the computational complexity of finding fair allocations of indivisible goods in the setting where a social network on the agents is given. Notions of fairness in this context are "localized", that is, agents are only concerned…

We study the classic divide-and-choose method for equitably allocating divisible goods between two players who are rational, self-interested Bayesian agents. The players have additive values for the goods. The prior distributions on those…

We compare the Egalitarian Equivalent and the Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes rules to divide a bundle of goods (heirlooms) or a bundle of bads (chores). For goods the Competitive division fares better, as it is Resource…

We study the classic problem of dividing a collection of indivisible resources in a fair and efficient manner among a set of agents having varied preferences. Pareto optimality is a standard notion of economic efficiency, which states that…

We consider the age-old problem of allocating items among different agents in a way that is efficient and fair. Two papers, by Dolev et al. and Ghodsi et al., have recently studied this problem in the context of computer systems. Both…

We investigate the problem of fairly dividing a divisible heterogeneous resource, also known as a cake, among a set of agents who may have different entitlements. We characterize the existence of a connected strongly-proportional allocation…

We study the problem of allocating indivisible items to agents with additive valuations, under the additional constraint that bundles must be connected in an underlying item graph. Previous work has considered the existence and complexity…

We show that, by using multiplicative weights in a game-theoretic thought experiment (and an important convexity result on the composition of multiplicative weights with the relative entropy function), a symmetric bimatrix game (that is, a…

We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among a set of agents in a fair and efficient manner. An allocation is said to be fair if it is envy-free up to one good (EF1), which means that each agent prefers its own bundle…

We study the max-min fair allocation problem in which a set of $m$ indivisible items are to be distributed among $n$ agents such that the minimum utility among all agents is maximized. In the restricted setting, the utility of each item $j$…

The fair division of chores, as well as mixed manna (goods and chores), has received substantial recent attention in the fair division literature; however, ours is the first paper to extend this research to matching markets. Indeed, our…

We prove that the classic problem of finding a competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisible goods, money, and unit-demand agents is PPAD-complete. In this "housing market", agents have preferences over the house and…

Envy-freeness is one of the most prominent fairness concepts in the allocation of indivisible goods. Even though trivial envy-free allocations always exist, rich literature shows this is not true when one additionally requires some…