相关论文: An Automated Framework for Board-level Trojan Benc…

Always-on hardware Trojans pose a serious challenge to integrated circuit trust, as they remain active during normal operation and are difficult to detect in post-deployment settings without trusted golden references. This paper presents a…

Many design companies have gone fabless and rely on external fabrication facilities to produce chips due to increasing cost of semiconductor manufacturing. However, not all of these facilities can be considered trustworthy; some may inject…

Due to the ever-growing demands for electronic chips in different sectors the semiconductor companies have been mandated to offshore their manufacturing processes. This unwanted matter has made security and trustworthiness of their…

System-on-chip (SoC) developers increasingly rely on pre-verified hardware intellectual property (IP) blocks acquired from untrusted third-party vendors. These IPs might contain hidden malicious functionalities or hardware Trojans to…

Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) hardware, such as microprocessors, are widely adopted in system design due to their ability to reduce development time and cost compared to custom solutions. However, supply chain entities involved in the…

We propose CLEANN, the first end-to-end framework that enables online mitigation of Trojans for embedded Deep Neural Network (DNN) applications. A Trojan attack works by injecting a backdoor in the DNN while training; during inference, the…

Many recent papers have proposed novel electrical measurements or physical inspection technologies for defending printed circuit boards (PCBs) and printed circuit board assemblies (PCBAs) against tampering. As motivation, these papers…

Owning a high-end semiconductor foundry is a luxury very few companies can afford. Thus, fabless design companies outsource integrated circuit fabrication to third parties. Within foundries, rogue elements may gain access to the customer's…

The reliability of the outcome of a quantum circuit in near-term noisy quantum computers depends on the gate count and depth for a given problem. Circuits with a short depth and lower gate count can yield the correct solution more often…

Properly benchmarking a system is a difficult and intricate task. Unfortunately, even a seemingly innocuous benchmarking mistake can compromise the guarantees provided by a given systems security defense and also put its reproducibility and…

Advances in reverse engineering make it challenging to deploy any on-chip information in a way that is hidden from a determined attacker. A variety of techniques have been proposed for design obfuscation including look-alike cells in which…

Trojan backdoor is a poisoning attack against Neural Network (NN) classifiers in which adversaries try to exploit the (highly desirable) model reuse property to implant Trojans into model parameters for backdoor breaches through a poisoned…

Backdoor (trojan) attacks embed hidden, controllable behaviors into machine-learning models so that models behave normally on benign inputs but produce attacker-chosen outputs when a trigger is present. This survey reviews the rapidly…

Analog and mixed-signal (A/MS) integrated circuits (ICs) are integral to safety-critical applications. However, the globalization and outsourcing of A/MS ICs to untrusted third-party foundries expose them to security threats, particularly…

The globalization of the Integrated Circuit (IC) supply chain has moved most of the design, fabrication, and testing process from a single trusted entity to various untrusted third-party entities around the world. The risk of using…

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have found extensive applications in safety-critical artificial intelligence systems, such as autonomous driving and facial recognition systems. However, recent research has revealed their susceptibility to…

Deep neural networks are known to have security issues. One particular threat is the Trojan attack. It occurs when the attackers stealthily manipulate the model's behavior through Trojaned training samples, which can later be exploited.…

Hardware security has risen in prominence in recent years with concerns stemming from a globalizing semiconductor supply chain and increased third-party IP (intellectual property) usage. Trojan detection is of paramount importance for…

While poisoning attacks on machine learning models have been extensively studied, the mechanisms by which adversaries can distribute poisoned models at scale remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we shed light on how model leaderboards…

The Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) launched the TrojAI program to confront an emerging vulnerability in modern artificial intelligence: the threat of AI Trojans. These AI trojans are malicious, hidden backdoors…