相关论文: Occupation measures arising in finite stochastic g…

This paper investigates the discrete-time asynchronous games in which noncooperative agents seek to minimize their individual cost functions. Building on the assumption of partial asynchronism, i.e., each agent updates at least once within…

We explore a mechanism of decision-making in Mean Field Games with myopic players. At each instant, agents set a strategy which optimizes their expected future cost by assuming their environment as immutable. As the system evolves, the…

We study nonzero-sum stochastic games for continuous time Markov decision processes on a denumerable state space with risk-sensitive ergodic cost criterion. Transition rates and cost rates are allowed to be unbounded. Under a Lyapunov type…

In this paper, we consider discrete-time partially observed mean-field games with the risk-sensitive optimality criterion. We introduce risk-sensitivity behaviour for each agent via an exponential utility function. In the game model, each…

In the paper we present a model of discrete-time mean-field game with several populations of players. Mean-field games with multiple populations of the players have only been studied in the literature in the continuous-time setting. The…

We study zero-sum stochastic differential games where the state dynamics of the two players is governed by a generalized McKean-Vlasov (or mean-field) stochastic differential equation in which the distribution of both state and controls of…

Zero sum games with risk-sensitive cost criterion are considered with underlying dynamics being given by controlled stochastic differential equations. Under the assumption of geometric stability on the dynamics , we completely characterize…

Expanding the ideas of the author's paper 'Nonexpansive maps and option pricing theory' (Kibernetica 34:6 (1998), 713-724) we develop a pure game-theoretic approach to option pricing, by-passing stochastic modeling. Risk neutral…

This paper introduces state abstraction for two-player zero-sum Markov games (TZMGs), where the payoffs for the two players are determined by the state representing the environment and their respective actions, with state transitions…

A game has approximate equilibria if for every $\epsilon >0$ there is an $\epsilon$-equilibrium. We show that there is a stochastic game that lacks approximate equilibria. This game has finitely many players and actions, their payoffs are…

We study Nash equilibria learning of a general-sum stochastic game with an unknown transition probability density function. Agents take actions at the current environment state and their joint action influences the transition of the…

We give an algorithm for solving stochastic parity games with almost-sure winning conditions on lossy channel systems, for the case where the players are restricted to finite-memory strategies. First, we describe a general framework, where…

We present a systematic investigation of the quantum games, constructed using a novel repeated game protocol, when played repeatedly ad infinitum. We focus on establishing that such repeated games -- by virtue of inherent quantum-mechanical…

We study the stochastic assignment game and extend it to model multimodal mobility markets with a regulator or a Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS) platform. We start by presenting general forms of one-to-one and many-to-many stochastic…

Reinforcement-based learning has attracted considerable attention both in modeling human behavior as well as in engineering, for designing measurement- or payoff-based optimization schemes. Such learning schemes exhibit several advantages,…

We show that every two-player stochastic game with finite state and action sets and bounded, Borel-measurable, and shift-invariant payoffs, admits an $\ep$-equilibrium for all $\varepsilon>0$.

We consider a Markovian stochastic control problem with model uncertainty. The controller (intelligent player) observes only the state, and, therefore, uses feed-back (closed-loop) strategies. The adverse player (nature) who does not have a…

Zero-sum Markov Stackelberg games can be used to model myriad problems, in domains ranging from economics to human robot interaction. In this paper, we develop policy gradient methods that solve these games in continuous state and action…

This paper has a two-folded purpose. First, we attempt to outline the development of the turnpike theorems in the the last several decades. Second, we study turnpike theorems in finite-horizon two-person zero-sum Markov games on a general…

Weighted timed games are two-player zero-sum games played in a timed automaton equipped with integer weights. We consider optimal reachability objectives, in which one of the players, that we call Min, wants to reach a target location while…