相关论文: When showing your hand pays off: Announcing strate…

Information asymmetry in games enables players with the information advantage to manipulate others' beliefs by strategically revealing information to other players. This work considers a double-sided information asymmetry in a Bayesian…

We investigate a two-period Bayesian persuasion game, where the receiver faces a decision, akin to a one-armed bandit problem: to undertake an action, gaining noisy information and a corresponding positive or negative payoff, or to refrain.…

Commitment is a well-established mechanism for fostering cooperation in human society and multi-agent systems. However, existing research has predominantly focused on the commitment that neglects the freedom of players to abstain from an…

We consider a multi-armed bandit setting that is inspired by real-world applications in e-commerce. In our setting, there are a few types of users, each with a specific response to the different arms. When a user enters the system, his type…

In competitive environments, commonly agents try to prevent opponents from achieving their goals. Most previous preventing approaches assume the opponent's goal is known a priori. Others only start executing actions once the opponent's goal…

Probabilistic concurrent/distributed strategies have so far not been investigated thoroughly in the context of imperfect information, where the Player has only partial knowledge of the moves made by the Opponent. In a situation where the…

It is shown in recent studies that in a Stackelberg game the follower can manipulate the leader by deviating from their true best-response behavior. Such manipulations are computationally tractable and can be highly beneficial for the…

We study information disclosure policies for contests among groups. Each player endogenously decides whether or not to participate in competition as a member of their group. Within-group aggregation of effort is best-shot, i.e., each…

I study optimal disclosure policies in sequential contests. A contest designer chooses at which periods to publicly disclose the efforts of previous contestants. I provide results for a wide range of possible objectives for the contest…

We study two-sided matching markets in which one side of the market (the players) does not have a priori knowledge about its preferences for the other side (the arms) and is required to learn its preferences from experience. Also, we assume…

The commitment power of senders distinguishes Bayesian persuasion problems from other games with (strategic) communication. Persuasion games with multiple senders have largely studied simultaneous commitment and signalling settings.…

Large language model-based (LLM-based) agents have become common in settings that include non-cooperative parties. In such settings, agents' decision-making needs to conceal information from their adversaries, reveal information to their…

A system relying on the collective behavior of decision-makers can be vulnerable to a variety of adversarial attacks. How well can a system operator protect performance in the face of these risks? We frame this question in the context of…

Both conventional wisdom and empirical evidence suggests that arranging a prior commitment or agreement before an interaction enhances the chance of reaching mutual cooperation. Yet it is not clear what mechanisms can promote the…

We consider preference communication in two-player multi-objective normal-form games. In such games, the payoffs resulting from joint actions are vector-valued. Taking a utility-based approach, we assume there exists a utility function for…

Iterated coopetitive games capture the situation when one must efficiently balance between cooperation and competition with the other agents over time in order to win the game (e.g., to become the player with highest total utility).…

Intention recognition is an important characteristic of intelligent agents. In their interactions with others, they try to read others' intentions and make an image of others to choose their actions accordingly. While the way in which…

Cooperative game theory has diverse applications in contemporary artificial intelligence, including domains like interpretable machine learning, resource allocation, and collaborative decision-making. However, specifying a cooperative game…

We study a class of finite-action disclosure games in which the sender's preferences are state-independent and the receiver's optimal action depends only on the expected state. While receiver-preferred equilibria in these games involve full…

We study a regime change game in which the state and an opposition leader both observe the regime's true strength and may engage in costly communication by manipulating the mean of citizens' private signals. Each citizen then decides…