相关论文: Distance-based Equilibria in Normal-Form Games

We consider the mean-field game where each agent determines the optimal time to exit the game by solving an optimal stopping problem with reward function depending on the density of the state processes of agents still present in the game.…

We introduce a new class of network allocation games called graphical distance preservation games. Here, we are given a graph, called a topology, and a set of agents that need to be allocated to its vertices. Moreover, every agent has an…

In order to have effective human-AI collaboration, it is necessary to address how the AI agent's behavior is being perceived by the humans-in-the-loop. When the agent's task plans are generated without such considerations, they may often…

We tackle the problem of learning equilibria in simulation-based games. In such games, the players' utility functions cannot be described analytically, as they are given through a black-box simulator that can be queried to obtain noisy…

We consider the interaction among agents engaging in a driving task and we model it as general-sum game. This class of games exhibits a plurality of different equilibria posing the issue of equilibrium selection. While selecting the most…

In this paper we focus on noncooperative games with uncertain constraints coupling the agents' decisions. We consider a setting where bounded deviations of agents' decisions from the equilibrium are possible, and uncertain constraints are…

A noncooperative differential (dynamic) game model of opinion dynamics is proposed. In this game, the agents' motives are shaped by their expectations of the nature of others' opinions as well as how susceptible they are to get influenced…

Aligning AI systems with human values remains a fundamental challenge, but does our inability to create perfectly aligned models preclude obtaining the benefits of alignment? We study a strategic setting where a human user interacts with…

As increasingly capable agents are deployed, a central safety challenge is how to retain meaningful human control without modifying the underlying system. We study a minimal control interface in which an agent chooses whether to act…

In an adversarial environment, a hostile player performing a task may behave like a non-hostile one in order not to reveal its identity to an opponent. To model such a scenario, we define identity concealment games: zero-sum stochastic…

Coordination games describe social or economic interactions in which the adoption of a common strategy has a higher payoff. They are classically used to model the spread of conventions, behaviors, and technologies in societies. Here we…

Remote estimation is a crucial element of real time monitoring of a stochastic process. While most of the existing works have concentrated on obtaining optimal sampling strategies, motivated by malicious attacks on cyber-physical systems,…

We study a general class of dynamic games with asymmetric information where agents' beliefs are strategy dependent, i.e. signaling occurs. We show that the notion of sufficient information, introduced in the companion paper team, can be…

In this paper, we present a method for finding approximate Nash equilibria in a broad class of reachability games. These games are often used to formulate both collision avoidance and goal satisfaction. Our method is computationally…

Multiagent learning settings are inherently more difficult than single-agent learning because each agent interacts with other simultaneously learning agents in a shared environment. An effective approach in multiagent reinforcement learning…

Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control techniques assume that observed behavior…

In security games, the solution concept commonly used is that of a Stackelberg equilibrium where the defender gets to commit to a mixed strategy. The motivation for this is that the attacker can repeatedly observe the defender's actions and…

This paper examines equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching games, extending Gale and Shapley's foundational model to a non-cooperative, decentralized, and dynamic framework. We focus on markets where agents have utility functions and…

We study decentralized equilibrium selection in stochastic games under severe information and communication constraints. In such settings, convergence to equilibrium alone is insufficient, as stochastic games typically admit many equilibria…

This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed…