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Notifications are important for the user experience in mobile apps and can influence their engagement. However, too many notifications can be disruptive for users. A typical mobile app usually has several types of notification, managed by…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2023-02-10 Christian Kroer , Deeksha Sinha , Xuan Zhang , Shiwen Cheng , Ziyu Zhou

We study a class of iterative combinatorial auctions which can be viewed as subgradient descent methods for the problem of pricing bundles to balance supply and demand. We provide concrete convergence rates for auctions in this class,…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2016-06-01 Jacob Abernethy , Sébastien Lahaie , Matus Telgarsky

We consider the question of whether collusion among bidders (a "bidding ring") can be supported in equilibrium of unrepeated first-price auctions. Unlike previous work on the topic such as that by McAfee and McMillan [1992] and Marshall and…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2016-08-31 Kevin Leyton-Brown , Moshe Tennenholtz , Navin Bhat , Yoav Shoham

This paper explores the integration of strategic optimization methods in search advertising, focusing on ad ranking and bidding mechanisms within E-commerce platforms. By employing a combination of reinforcement learning and evolutionary…

机器学习 · 计算机科学 2024-05-30 Chang Zhou , Yang Zhao , Jin Cao , Yi Shen , Xiaoling Cui , Chiyu Cheng

Internet search results are a growing and highly profitable advertising platform. Search providers auction advertising slots to advertisers on their search result pages. Due to the high volume of searches and the users' low tolerance for…

数据库 · 计算机科学 2016-11-17 David J. Martin , Johannes Gehrke , Joseph Y. Halpern

The convergence properties of learning dynamics in repeated auctions is a timely and important question, with numerous applications in, e.g., online advertising markets. This work focuses on repeated first-price auctions where bidders with…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2025-08-21 Xiaotie Deng , Xinyan Hu , Tao Lin , Weiqiang Zheng

We study the price of anarchy of the first-price auction in the autobidding world, where bidders can be either utility maximizers (i.e., traditional bidders) or value maximizers (i.e., autobidders). We show that with autobidders only, the…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2022-08-24 Yuan Deng , Jieming Mao , Vahab Mirrokni , Hanrui Zhang , Song Zuo

Modern commercial Internet search engines display advertisements along side the search results in response to user queries. Such sponsored search relies on market mechanisms to elicit prices for these advertisements, making use of an…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2008-12-18 Jon Feldman , S. Muthukrishnan

It has become the default in markets such as ad auctions for participants to bid in an auction through automated bidding agents (autobidders) which adjust bids over time to satisfy return-over-spend constraints. Despite the prominence of…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-07-03 Renato Paes Leme , Georgios Piliouras , Jon Schneider , Kelly Spendlove , Song Zuo

We consider auction environments in which at the time of the auction bidders observe signals about their ex-post value. We introduce a model of novice bidders who do not know know the joint distribution of signals and instead build a…

理论经济学 · 经济学 2021-07-02 Philippe Jehiel , Konrad Mierendorff

Sponsored search becomes an easy platform to match potential consumers' intent with merchants' advertising. Advertisers express their willingness to pay for each keyword in terms of bids to the search engine. When a user's query matches the…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2012-07-20 Chenyang Li , Mingyi Hong , Randy Cogill , Alfredo Garcia

We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their opponents. The seller only knows the (possibly…

理论经济学 · 经济学 2022-02-16 Ethan Che

Consider a seller that intends to auction some item. The seller can invest money and effort in advertising in different market segments in order to recruit $n$ bidders to the auction. Alternatively, the seller can have a much cheaper and…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2021-06-03 Amir Ban , Avi Cohen , Shahar Dobzinski , Itai Ashlagi

First-price auctions have largely replaced traditional bidding approaches based on Vickrey auctions in programmatic advertising. As far as learning is concerned, first-price auctions are more challenging because the optimal bidding strategy…

机器学习 · 计算机科学 2021-11-23 Juliette Achddou , Olivier Cappé , Aurélien Garivier

We consider the problem of computing a (pure) Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the first-price auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when bidders have independent subjective prior beliefs about the…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2023-03-06 Aris Filos-Ratsikas , Yiannis Giannakopoulos , Alexandros Hollender , Philip Lazos , Diogo Poças

Search auctions have become a dominant source of revenue generation on the Internet. Such auctions have typically used per-click bidding and pricing. We propose the use of hybrid auctions where an advertiser can make a per-impression as…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2009-01-26 Ashish Goel , Kamesh Munagala

In online advertising, search engines sell ad placements for keywords continuously through auctions. This problem can be seen as an infinitely repeated game since the auction is executed whenever a user performs a query with the keyword. As…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2022-01-25 Francesco Belardinelli , Wojtek Jamroga , Vadim Malvone , Munyque Mittelmann , Aniello Murano , Laurent Perrussel

On ad exchange platforms the place for advertisement is sold through different kinds of auctions. However, it is not uncommon the situation where the seller repeatedly encounters only one buyer, thus the posted price auction degenerates…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2019-02-05 Nikita Kalinin

Ad exchanges are becoming an increasingly popular way to sell advertisement slots on the internet. An ad exchange is basically a spot market for ad impressions. A publisher who has already signed contracts reserving advertisement…

数据结构与算法 · 计算机科学 2016-04-20 Wolfgang Dvořák , Monika Henzinger

Simultaneous ascending auctions present agents with the exposure problem: bidding to acquire a bundle risks the possibility of obtaining an undesired subset of the goods. Auction theory provides little guidance for dealing with this…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2012-07-09 Anna Osepayshvili , Michael P. Wellman , Daniel Reeves , Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason