相关论文: Egoistic Incentives Based on Zero-Determinant Alli…

We introduce one-way games, a framework motivated by applications in large-scale power restoration, humanitarian logistics, and integrated supply-chains. The distinguishable feature of the games is that the payoff of some player is…

This paper studies social interactions in a game theoretic model with players in a large social network. We consider observations from one single equilibrium of a large network game with asymmetric information, in which each player chooses…

Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the possibility to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of…

Many real-world systems such as taxi systems, traffic networks and smart grids involve self-interested actors that perform individual tasks in a shared environment. However, in such systems, the self-interested behaviour of agents produces…

Combined prosocial incentives, integrating reward for cooperators and punishment for defectors, are effective tools to promote cooperation among competing agents in population games. Existing research concentrated on how to adjust reward or…

Network-based systems are inherently interconnected, with the design and performance of subnetworks being interdependent. However, the decisions of self-interested operators may lead to suboptimal outcomes for users and the overall system.…

The advent of Zero-Determinant (ZD) strategies has reshaped the study of reciprocity and cooperation in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games. The ramification of ZD strategies has been demonstrated through their ability to unilaterally…

In this paper, we study the problem of cost optimisation of individual-based institutional incentives (reward, punishment, and hybrid) for guaranteeing a certain minimal level of cooperative behaviour in a well-mixed, finite population. In…

Originating in evolutionary game theory, the class of "zero-determinant" strategies enables a player to unilaterally enforce linear payoff relationships in simple repeated games. An upshot of this kind of payoff constraint is that it can…

Social dilemmas present a significant challenge in multi-agent cooperation because individuals are incentivised to behave in ways that undermine socially optimal outcomes. Consequently, self-interested agents often avoid collective…

Social dilemmas, where mutual cooperation can lead to high payoffs but participants face incentives to cheat, are ubiquitous in multi-agent interaction. We wish to construct agents that cooperate with pure cooperators, avoid exploitation by…

Wealthy individuals may be less tempted to defect than those with comparatively low payoffs. To take this into consideration, we introduce coevolutionary success-driven multigames in structured populations. While the core game is always the…

Imitation is widely observed in populations of decision-making agents. Using our recent convergence results for asynchronous imitation dynamics on networks, we consider how such networks can be efficiently driven to a desired equilibrium…

We considered a three-strategy game with the characteristics of the prisoner's dilemma and stag hunt games. This game was inspired by recent experimental studies that elucidated the role of individual solutions. People who adopt individual…

The application of incentives, such as reward and punishment, is a frequently applied way for promoting cooperation among interacting individuals in structured populations. However, how to properly use the incentives is still a challenging…

There is a broad recognition that commitment-based mechanisms can promote coordination and cooperative behaviours in both biological populations and self-organised multi-agent systems by making individuals' intentions explicit prior to…

Traditional evolutionary game theory describes how certain strategy spreads throughout the system where individual player imitates the most successful strategy among its neighborhood. Accordingly, player doesn't have own authority to change…

The very notion of social network implies that linked individuals interact repeatedly with each other. This allows them not only to learn successful strategies and adapt to them, but also to condition their own behavior on the behavior of…

In this work we investigate the inefficiency of the electricity system with strategic agents. Specifically, we prove that without a proper control the total demand of an inefficient system is at most twice the total demand of the optimal…

In social dilemmas, most interactions are transient and susceptible to restructuring, leading to continuous changes in social networks over time. Typically, agents assess the rewards of their current interactions and adjust their…