相关论文: False Data Injection Attacks and the Distributed C…

This paper introduces a novel, fully distributed control framework for DC microgrids, enhancing resilience against exponentially unbounded false data injection (EU-FDI) attacks. Our framework features a consensus-based secondary control for…

The evolution of the traditional power system towards the modern smart grid has posed many new cybersecurity challenges to this critical infrastructure. One of the most dangerous cybersecurity threats is the False Data Injection (FDI)…

The advent of smart power grid which plays a vital role in the upcoming smart city era is accompanied with the implementation of a monitoring tool, called state estimation. For the case of the unbalanced residential distribution grid, the…

Modern advances in sensor, computing, and communication technologies enable various smart grid applications. The heavy dependence on communication technology has highlighted the vulnerability of the electricity grid to false data injection…

The false data injection (FDI) attack cannot be detected by the traditional anomaly detection techniques used in the energy system state estimators. In this paper, we demonstrate how FDI attacks can be constructed blindly, i.e., without…

With the proliferation of smart devices and revolutions in communications, electrical distribution systems are gradually shifting from passive, manually-operated and inflexible ones, to a massively interconnected cyber-physical smart grid…

This paper studies physical consequences of unobservable false data injection (FDI) attacks designed only with information inside a sub-network of the power system. The goal of this attack is to overload a chosen target line without being…

Small-Signal Stability (SSS) is crucial for the control of power grids. However, False Data Injection (FDI) attacks against SSS can impact the grid stability, hence, the security of SSS needs to be studied. This paper proposes a formal…

Power systems are moving towards hybrid AC/DC grids with the integration of HVDC links, renewable resources and energy storage modules. New models of frequency control have to consider the complex interactions between these components.…

This paper studies the vulnerability of phasor measurement units (PMUs) to false data injection (FDI) attacks. Prior work demonstrated that unobservable FDI attacks that can bypass traditional bad data detectors based on measurement…

The smart grid combines the classical power system with information technology, leading to a cyber-physical system. In such an environment the malicious injection of data has the potential to cause severe consequences. Classical…

The cybersecurity of microgrid has received widespread attentions due to the frequently reported attack accidents against distributed energy resource (DER) manufactures. Numerous impact mitigation schemes have been proposed to reduce or…

We address the problem of constructing false data injection (FDI) attacks that can bypass the bad data detector (BDD) of a power grid. The attacker is assumed to have access to only power flow measurement data traces (collected over a…

A class of data integrity attack, known as false data injection (FDI) attack, has been studied with a considerable amount of work. It has shown that with perfect knowledge of the system model and the capability to manipulate a certain…

This letter proposes a novel, fully distributed, transient-safe resilient secondary control strategies for AC microgrids, addressing unbounded false data injection (FDI) attacks on control input channels. Unlike existing methods that focus…

The number of installed remote terminal units (RTU) is on the rise, increasing the observability and control of the power system. RTUs enable sending data to and receiving data from a control center in the power system. A distribution grid…

In this paper, we present a novel distributed state estimation approach in networked DC microgrids to detect the false data injection in the microgrid control network. Each microgrid monitored by a distributed state estimator will detect if…

Cyberattack susceptibilities are introduced as the communication requirement increases with the incorporation of more renewable energy sources into DC microgrids. Parallel DC-DC converters are utilized to provide high current and supply the…

This paper studies false data injection (FDI) attacks against phasor measurement units (PMUs). As compared to the conventional bad data detector (BDD), an enhanced BDD utilizing the effect of zero injection buses is proposed. Feasible…

In the recent years cyberattacks to smart grids are becoming more frequent Among the many malicious activities that can be launched against smart grids False Data Injection FDI attacks have raised significant concerns from both academia and…