This paper studies the vulnerability of phasor measurement units (PMUs) to false data injection (FDI) attacks. Prior work demonstrated that unobservable FDI attacks that can bypass traditional bad data detectors based on measurement residuals can be identified by detector based on low-rank decomposition (LD). In this work, a class of more sophisticated FDI attacks that captures the temporal correlation of PMU data is introduced. Such attacks are designed with a convex optimization problem and can always bypass the LD detector. The vulnerability of this attack model is illustrated on both the IEEE 24-bus RTS and the IEEE 118-bus systems.
@article{arxiv.1705.02038,
title = {False Data Injection Attacks on Phasor Measurements That Bypass Low-rank Decomposition},
author = {Jiazi Zhang and Zhigang Chu and Lalitha Sankar and Oliver Kosut},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.02038},
year = {2017}
}
Comments
6 pages, 4 figures, submitted to 2017 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm)