This paper studies false data injection (FDI) attacks against phasor measurement units (PMUs). As compared to the conventional bad data detector (BDD), an enhanced BDD utilizing the effect of zero injection buses is proposed. Feasible conditions under which FDI attacks are unobservable to this enhanced BDD are discussed. In addition, a class of multiplicative FDI attacks that maintain the rank of the PMU measurement matrix is introduced. Simulation results on the IEEE RTS-24-bus system indicate that the these multiplicative unobservable attacks can avoid detection by both the enhanced BDD and a detector based on low-rank decomposition proposed in prior work.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1806.05057,
title = {Unobservable False Data Injection Attacks against PMUs: Feasible Conditions and Multiplicative Attacks},
author = {Zhigang Chu and Jiazi Zhang and Oliver Kosut and Lalitha Sankar},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.05057},
year = {2018}
}