相关论文: Dynamic Contract Design for Systemic Cyber Risk Ma…
We study the fundamental problem of designing contracts in principal-agent problems under uncertainty. Previous works mostly addressed Bayesian settings in which principal's uncertainty is modeled as a probability distribution over agent's…
We study optimal contract design for large populations of heterogeneous agents whose actions generate network spillovers represented by an interaction function. In a linear-quadratic framework, we solve the finite-agent problem and its…
We study a market of investments on networks, where each agent (vertex) can invest in any enterprise linked to her, and at the same time, raise capital for her firm's enterprise from other agents she is linked to. Failing to raise…
In this article, we employ a principal-agent model to analyze optimal contract design in a monopolistic reinsurance market under adverse selection with a continuum of insurer types. Instead of using the classical expected utility framework,…
Nowadays, cyber threats are considered among the most dangerous risks by top management of enterprises. One way to deal with these risks is to insure them, but cyber insurance is still quite expensive. The insurance fee can be reduced if…
Dynamic contracts with multiple agents is a classical decentralized decision-making problem with asymmetric information. In this paper, we extend the single-agent dynamic incentive contract model in continuous-time to a multi-agent scheme…
The increasing frequency, impact, consequence and sophistication of cybersecurity attacks is becoming a strategic concern for boards and executive management of organisations. Consequently, in addition to focusing on productivity and…
Malicious softwares or malwares for short have become a major security threat. While originating in criminal behavior, their impact are also influenced by the decisions of legitimate end users. Getting agents in the Internet, and in…
We study hidden-action principal-agent problems with multiple agents. These are problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme in order to incentivize some agents to take costly, unobservable actions that lead…
We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a…
We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme (a.k.a. contract) so as to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action. We relax the assumption that the principal perfectly…
Internet users such as individuals and organizations are subject to different types of epidemic risks such as worms, viruses, and botnets. To reduce the probability of risk, an Internet user generally invests in self-defense mechanisms like…
We consider the problem of Adverse Selection and optimal derivative design within a Principal-Agent framework. The principal's income is exposed to non-hedgeable risk factors arising, for instance, from weather or climate phenomena. She…
A contract is an economic tool used by a principal to incentivize one or more agents to exert effort on her behalf, by defining payments based on observable performance measures. A key challenge addressed by contracts -- known in economics…
Though the sharing of medical data has the potential to lead to breakthroughs in health care, the sharing process itself exposes patients and health care providers to various risks. Patients face risks due to the possible loss in privacy or…
We introduce a decision-making framework tailored for the management of systemic risk in networks. This framework is constructed upon three fundamental components: (1) a set of acceptable network configurations, (2) a set of interventions…
This paper considers dynamic moral hazard settings, in which the consequences of the agent's actions are not precisely understood. In a new continuous-time moral hazard model with drift ambiguity, the agent's unobservable action translates…
Environments with fixed adjustment costs such as transaction costs or \lq menu costs\rq$ $ are widespread within economic systems. The presence of fixed minimal adjustment costs produces adjustment stickiness so that agents must choose a…
Algorithmic contract design studies scenarios where a principal incentivizes an agent to exert effort on her behalf. In this work, we focus on settings where the agent's type is drawn from an unknown distribution, and formalize an offline…
Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) enable new kinds of applications as well as significant improvements of existing ones in numerous different application domains. A major trait of upcoming CPS is an increasing degree of automation up to the…