相关论文: Dynamic Contract Design for Systemic Cyber Risk Ma…

The development of mobile cloud computing has brought many benefits to mobile users as well as cloud service providers. However, mobile cloud computing is facing some challenges, especially security-related problems due to the growing…

We consider a hidden-action principal-agent model, in which actions require different amounts of effort, and the agent privately knows his ability that determines his cost of effort. We show that linear contracts admit approximation…

Mobile data demand is increasing tremendously in wireless social networks, and thus an efficient pricing scheme for social-enabled services is urgently needed. Though static pricing is dominant in the actual data market, price intuitively…

This study examines the strategic role of cybersecurity based on survey data from 1,083 managers across Europe, the UK, and the United States. The findings indicate growing recognition of cybersecurity as a source of competitive advantage,…

This paper studies the real-time implementation of distributed controllers on networked cyber-physical systems. We build on the strengths of event- and self-triggered control to synthesize a unified approach, termed team-triggered, where…

In an ever more connected world, awareness has grown towards the hazards and vulnerabilities that the networking on sensitive digitized information pose for all parties involved. This vulnerability rests in a number of factors, both human…

This work considers a repeated principal-agent bandit game, where the principal can only interact with her environment through the agent. The principal and the agent have misaligned objectives and the choice of action is only left to the…

We study the consequences of information asymmetries and misaligned incentives in settings with multiple independent agents. We model an interaction between a Sender, who holds vital private information but cannot act, and a Receiver, who…

A system relying on the collective behavior of decision-makers can be vulnerable to a variety of adversarial attacks. How well can a system operator protect performance in the face of these risks? We frame this question in the context of…

This paper studies a strategic security problem in networked control systems under stealthy false data injection attacks. The security problem is modeled as a bilateral cognitive security game between a defender and an adversary, each…

Blockchain technology enables the execution of collaborative business processes involving mutually untrusted parties. Existing platforms allow such processes to be modeled using high-level notations and compiled into smart contracts that…

We introduce a novel framework for computing optimal randomized security policies in networked domains which extends previous approaches in several ways. First, we extend previous linear programming techniques for Stackelberg security games…

We take the position that agent security must be approached as a systems problem: the AI model powering the agent must be treated as an untrusted component, and security invariants must be enforced at the system level. Through this lens,…

This paper considers the hidden-action model of the principal-agent problem, in which a principal incentivizes an agent to work on a project using a contract. We investigate whether contracts with bounded payments are learnable and…

We study the problem of demand response contracts in electricity markets by quantifying the impact of considering a mean-field of consumers, whose consumption is impacted by a common noise. We formulate the problem as a Principal-Agent…

Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents can now orchestrate cyberattacks. This development is already increasing the speed and scale of cyber attacks, decreasing attack costs, and improving the operational autonomy of cyber capabilities. To…

Modern distributed data management systems face a new challenge: how can autonomous, mutually-distrusting parties cooperate safely and effectively? Addressing this challenge brings up questions familiar from classical distributed systems:…

We introduce a game-theoretic model to investigate the strategic interaction between a cyber insurance policyholder whose premium depends on her self-reported security level and an insurer with the power to audit the security level upon…

The design of punishment policies applied to specific domains linking agents actions to material penalties is an open research issue. The proposed framework applies principles of contract law to set penalties: expectation damages,…

We consider a seller who offers services to a buyer with multi-unit demand. Prior to the realization of demand, the buyer receives a noisy signal of their future demand, and the seller can design contracts based on the reported value of…