相关论文: A Nash-Type Fictitious Game Framework to Time-Inco…

We consider a noncooperative $n$-player principal eigenvalue game which is associated with an infinitesimal generator of a stochastically perturbed multi-channel dynamical system -- where, in the course of such a game, each player attempts…

A model of stochastic games where multiple controllers jointly control the evolution of the state of a dynamic system but have access to different information about the state and action processes is considered. The asymmetry of information…

In this paper a consensus has been constructed in a social network which is modeled by a stochastic differential game played by agents of that network. Each agent independently minimizes a cost function which represents their motives. A…

We present novel techniques for neuro-symbolic concurrent stochastic games, a recently proposed modelling formalism to represent a set of probabilistic agents operating in a continuous-space environment using a combination of neural network…

In this paper, the known deterministic linear-quadratic Stackelberg game is revisited, whose open-loop Stackelberg solution actually possesses the nature of time inconsistency. To handle this time inconsistency, {a two-tier game framework…

This paper establishes the tractability of finding the optimal Nash equilibrium, as well as the optimal social solution, to a discrete congestion game using a gate-model quantum computer. The game is of the type originally posited by…

This paper investigates the Nash equilibrium seeking problems for networked games with intermittent communication, where each player is capable of communicating with other players intermittently over a strongly connected and directed graph.…

In this paper, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium of a multi-player game is considered. The players are only aware of their own cost functions as well as the action space of all players. We develop a relatively fast algorithm within…

We study optimal equilibria in multi-player games. An equilibrium is optimal for a player, if her payoff is maximal. A tempting approach to solving this problem is to seek optimal Nash equilibria, the standard form of equilibria where no…

This article introduces a class of $Nash$ games among $Stackelberg$ players ($NASPs$), namely, a class of simultaneous non-cooperative games where the players solve sequential Stackelberg games. Specifically, each player solves a…

Nash equilibrium is a solution concept in non-strictly competitive, non-cooperative game theory that finds applications in various scientific and engineering disciplines. A non-strictly competitive, non-cooperative game model is presented…

In this paper, an open-loop two-person non-zero sum stochastic differential game is considered for forward-backward stochastic systems. More precisely, the controlled systems are described by a fully coupled nonlinear multi- dimensional…

Trajectory planning for autonomous race cars poses special challenges due to the highly interactive and competitive environment. Prior work has applied game theory as it provides equilibria for such non-cooperative dynamic problems. This…

This paper investigates a two-person non-homogeneous linear-quadratic stochastic differential game (LQ-SDG, for short) in an infinite horizon for a system regulated by a time-invariant Markov chain. Both non-zero-sum and zero-sum LQ-SDG…

Finite-horizon probabilistic multiagent concurrent game systems, also known as finite multiplayer stochastic games, are a well-studied model in computer science due to their ability to represent a wide range of real-world scenarios…

We study the problem of computing an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work by Borgs et al. [2010] suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a slight change to their model---modeling the players…

We consider a distributed stochastic approximation (SA) scheme for computing an equilibrium of a stochastic Nash game. Standard SA schemes employ diminishing steplength sequences that are square summable but not summable. Such requirements…

We consider a large population dynamic game in discrete time where players are characterized by time-evolving types. It is a natural assumption that the players' actions cannot anticipate future values of their types. Such games go under…

This paper investigates the convergence time of log-linear learning to an $\epsilon$-efficient Nash equilibrium in potential games, where an efficient Nash equilibrium is defined as the maximizer of the potential function. Previous…

We develop the fictitious play algorithm in the context of the linear programming approach for mean field games of optimal stopping and mean field games with regular control and absorption. This algorithm allows to approximate the mean…