相关论文: Dominance, Sharing, and Assessment in an Iterated …
We develop a model to describe the development of dominance relations between social animals as they use past experiences to inform future interactions. Using the game-theoretic framework of a Hawk-Dove game with asymmetric resource-holding…
In the animal world, the competition between individuals belonging to different species for a resource often requires the cooperation of several individuals in groups. This paper proposes a generalization of the Hawk-Dove Game for an…
In an iterated two-person game, for instance prisoner's dilemma or the snowdrift game, there exist strategies that force the payoffs of the opponents to be equal. These equalizer strategies form a subset of the more general zero-determinant…
The last financial and economic crisis demonstrated the dysfunctional long-term effects of aggressive behaviour in financial markets. Yet, evolutionary game theory predicts that under the condition of strategic dependence a certain degree…
Each participant in peer-to-peer network prefers to free-ride on the contribution of other participants. Reputation based resource sharing is a way to control the free riding. Instead of classical game theory we use evolutionary game theory…
Members of a social species need to make appropriate decisions about who, how, and when to interact with others in their group. However, it has been difficult for researchers to detect the inputs to these decisions and, in particular, how…
The serious games between humans and AI have only just begun. Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) models the competitive and cooperative strategies of biological entities. EGT could help predict the potential evolutionary equilibrium of humans…
Game theory provides a quantitative framework for analyzing the behavior of rational agents. The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in particular has become a standard model for studying cooperation and cheating, with cooperation often emerging as…
Long-term evolutionary processes can strongly influence common-pool resource conservation by generating new traits or behaviours that modify the feedback between population strategies and the resource state. Here we develop an…
We revisit the original hawk-dove game with slight modifications to payoff values while maintaining the fundamental principles of interaction. The practical robustness of the theoretical tools of game theory is tested on a simulated…
Group-based social dominance hierarchies are of essential interest in animal behavior research. Studies often record aggressive interactions observed over time, and models that can capture such dynamic hierarchy are therefore crucial.…
The classical idea of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) modeling animal behavior does not involve any spatial dependence. We considered a spatial Hawk-Dove game played by animals in a patchy environment with wrap around boundaries. We…
In general-sum games, the interaction of self-interested learning agents commonly leads to socially worse outcomes, such as defect-defect in the iterated stag hunt (ISH). Previous works address this challenge by sharing rewards or shaping…
The hawk-dove game admits two types of equilibria: an asymmetric pure equilibrium in which players in one population play hawk and players in the other population play dove, and an inefficient symmetric mixed equilibrium, in which hawks are…
We explore the Hawk-Dove game on networks with topologies ranging from regular lattices to random graphs with small-world networks in between. This is done by means of computer simulations using several update rules for the population…
People make strategic decisions many times a day - during negotiations, when coordinating actions with others, or when choosing partners for cooperation. The resulting dynamics can be studied with learning theory and evolutionary game…
In the realm of evolutionary game theory, standard frameworks typically presuppose that every player possesses comprehensive knowledge and unrestricted access to the entire strategy space. However, real-world human society inherently…
We report on new stability conditions for evolutionary dynamics in the context of population games. We adhere to the prevailing framework consisting of many agents, grouped into populations, that interact noncooperatively by selecting…
One of the best examples of traditional analysis of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) is provided by the so called Dove-Hawk model. In this paper we present several enhancements to the model aimed at describing the evolution of…
Using a set of heterogeneous competing systems with intra-system cooperation and inter-system aggression, we show how the coevolution of the system parameters (degree of organization and conditions for aggression) depends on the rate of…