相关论文: Bitcoin Selfish Mining and Dyck Words

The paper constructs a multi-variate Hawkes process model of Bitcoin block arrivals and price jumps. Hawkes processes are selfexciting point processes that can capture the self- and cross-excitation effects of block mining and Bitcoin price…

In recent years, cryptocurrencies have attracted growing attention from both private investors and institutions. Among them, Bitcoin stands out for its impressive volatility and widespread influence. This paper explores the predictability…

We present an analysis of the Proof-of-Work consensus algorithm, used on the Bitcoin blockchain, using a Mean Field Game framework. Using a master equation, we provide an equilibrium characterization of the total computational power devoted…

Mining processes of Bitcoin and similar cryptocurrencies are currently incentivized with voluntary transaction fees and fixed block rewards which will halve gradually to zero. In the setting where optional and arbitrary transaction fee…

The arisen of Bitcoin has led to much enthusiasm for blockchain research and block mining, and the extensive existence of mining pools helps its participants (i.e., miners) gain reward more frequently. Recently, the mining pools are proved…

A proof of work (PoW) blockchain protocol distributes rewards to its participants, called miners, according to their share of the total computational power. Sufficiently large miners can perform selfish mining - deviate from the protocol to…

We present a strategy for a single quantum miner with relatively low hashing power, with the same ramifications as a 51% attack. Bitcoin nodes consider the chain with the highest cumulative proof-of-work to be the valid chain. A quantum…

We consider the hedging problem where a futures position can be automatically liquidated by the exchange without notice. We derive a semi-closed form for an optimal hedging strategy with dual objectives - to minimise both the variance of…

Several attacks have been proposed against Proof-of-Work blockchains, which may increase the attacker's share of mining rewards (e.g., selfish mining, block withholding). A further impact of such attacks, which has not been considered in…

The core of many cryptocurrencies is the decentralised validation network operating on proof-of-work technology. In these systems, validation is done by so-called miners who can digitally sign blocks once they solve a computationally-hard…

Cryptocurrencies employ auction-esque transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs) to allocate transactions to blocks, and to determine how much fees miners can collect from transactions. Several impossibility results show that TFMs that satisfy a…

In this short note we show that the Bitcoin network can allow remote parties to gamble with their bitcoins by tossing a fair or biased coin, with no need for a trusted party, and without the possibility of extortion by dishonest parties who…

We study the strategic considerations of miners participating in the bitcoin's protocol. We formulate and study the stochastic game that underlies these strategic considerations. The miners collectively build a tree of blocks, and they are…

We present a new Bitcoin coin selection algorithm, "coin selection with leverage", which aims to improve upon cost savings than that of standard knapsack like approaches. Parameters to the new algorithm are available to be tuned at the…

In this paper we develop a linear expectile hidden Markov model for the analysis of cryptocurrency time series in a risk management framework. The methodology proposed allows to focus on extreme returns and describe their temporal evolution…

We give an explicit definition of decentralization and show you that decentralization is almost impossible for the current stage and Bitcoin is the first truly noncentralized currency in the currency history. We propose a new framework of…

What happens to mining when the Bitcoin price changes, when there are mining supply shocks, the price of energy changes, or hardware technology evolves? We give precise answers based on the technical forces and incentives in the system. We…

Proof-of-Work (PoW) is a Sybil control mechanism adopted in blockchain-based cryptocurrencies. It prevents the attempt of malicious actors to manipulate distributed ledgers. Bitcoin has successfully suppressed double-spending by accepting…

The Bitcoin cryptocurrency records its transactions in a public log called the blockchain. Its security rests critically on the distributed protocol that maintains the blockchain, run by participants called miners. Conventional wisdom…

We prove Bitcoin is secure under temporary dishonest majority. We assume the adversary can corrupt a specific fraction of parties and also introduce crash failures, i.e., some honest participants are offline during the execution of the…