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The arrival process of bidders and bids in online auctions is important for studying and modeling supply and demand in the online marketplace. A popular assumption in the online auction literature is that a Poisson bidder arrival process is…

应用统计 · 统计学 2007-12-18 Galit Shmueli , Ralph P. Russo , Wolfgang Jank

In this paper, we introduce a novel, non-recursive, maximal matching algorithm for double auctions, which aims to maximize the amount of commodities to be traded. It differs from the usual equilibrium matching, which clears a market at the…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2013-04-12 Jinzhong Niu , Simon Parsons

We focus on online second price auctions, where bids are made sequentially, and the winning bidder pays the maximum of the second-highest bid and a seller specified starting price. For many such auctions, the seller does not see all the…

统计方法学 · 统计学 2026-02-23 Sourav Mukherjee , Ziqian Yang , Rohit K Patra , Kshitij Khare

In many applications, ads are displayed together with the prices, so as to provide a direct comparison among similar products or services. The price-displaying feature not only influences the consumers' decisions, but also affects the…

人工智能 · 计算机科学 2023-03-24 Bin Li , Yahui Lei

We perform a simulation-based analysis of keyword auctions modeled as one-shot games of incomplete information to study a series of mechanism design questions. Our first question addresses the degree to which incentive compatibility fails…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2012-05-14 Yevgeniy Vorobeychik

This study explores the monotonicity of adaptive clinching auctions -- a key mechanism in budget-constrained auctions -- with respect to fluctuations in the number of bidders. Specifically, we investigate how the addition of new bidders…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2025-02-11 Ryosuke Sato

We design fair sponsored search auctions that achieve a near-optimal tradeoff between fairness and quality. Our work builds upon the model and auction design of Chawla and Jagadeesan \cite{CJ22}, who considered the special case of a single…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2022-04-11 Shuchi Chawla , Rojin Rezvan , Nathaniel Sauerberg

Game theory has been developed by scientists as a theory of strategic interaction among players who are supposed to be perfectly rational. These strategic interactions might have been presented in an auction, a business negotiation, a chess…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2020-04-07 Medet Kanmaz , Elif Surer

Sharing systems have facilitated the redistribution of underused resources by providing convenient online marketplaces for individual sellers and buyers. However, sellers in these systems may not fully disclose the information of their…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2023-09-01 Ningning Ding , Zhixuan Fang , Jianwei Huang

Throttling is a popular method of budget management for online ad auctions in which the platform modulates the participation probability of an advertiser in order to smoothly spend her budget across many auctions. In this work, we…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2023-02-07 Xi Chen , Christian Kroer , Rachitesh Kumar

All-pay auctions, a common mechanism for various human and agent interactions, suffers, like many other mechanisms, from the possibility of players' failure to participate in the auction. We model such failures, and fully characterize…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2017-02-15 Yoad Lewenberg , Omer Lev , Yoram Bachrach , Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

The growing demand for data and AI-generated digital goods, such as personalized written content and artwork, necessitates effective pricing and feedback mechanisms that account for uncertain utility and costly production. Motivated by…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2023-06-06 Zachary Robertson , Oluwasanmi Koyejo

We examine trade-offs among stakeholders in ad auctions. Our metrics are the revenue for the utility of the auctioneer, the number of clicks for the utility of the users and the welfare for the utility of the advertisers. We show how to…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2014-04-22 Yoram Bachrach , Sofia Ceppi , Ian A. Kash , Peter Key , David Kurokawa

Online auctions are one of the most fundamental facets of the modern economy and power an industry generating hundreds of billions of dollars a year in revenue. Auction theory has historically focused on the question of designing the best…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2021-09-23 Thomas Nedelec , Clément Calauzènes , Noureddine El Karoui , Vianney Perchet

Interactions between bids to show ads online can lead to an advertiser's ad being shown to more men than women even when the advertiser does not target towards men. We design bidding strategies that advertisers can use to avoid such…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2019-09-06 Milad Nasr , Michael Tschantz

The rise of algorithmic pricing in online retail platforms has attracted significant interest in how autonomous software agents interact under competition. This article explores the potential emergence of algorithmic collusion -…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2025-04-24 Martin Bichler , Julius Durmann , Matthias Oberlechner

Market manipulation is a strategy used by traders to alter the price of financial securities. One type of manipulation is based on the process of buying or selling assets by using several trading strategies, among them spoofing is a popular…

交易与市场微观结构 · 定量金融 2015-11-04 Enrique Martínez-Miranda , Peter McBurney , Matthew J. Howard

Bid shading has become a standard practice in the digital advertising industry, in which most auctions for advertising (ad) opportunities are now of first price type. Given an ad opportunity, performing bid shading requires estimating not…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-10-22 Yanlin Qu , Ravi Kant , Yan Chen , Brendan Kitts , San Gultekin , Aaron Flores , Jose Blanchet

Core-selecting combinatorial auctions are popular auction designs that constrain prices to eliminate the incentive for any group of bidders -- with the seller -- to renegotiate for a better deal. They help overcome the low-revenue issues of…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2025-05-21 Siddharth Prasad , Maria-Florina Balcan , Tuomas Sandholm

Incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing are designed to incentivize financially self-interested workers to generate and report high-quality labels. Existing mechanisms are often developed as one-shot static solutions, assuming a certain…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2018-06-04 Zehong Hu , Yitao Liang , Yang Liu , Jie Zhang
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