相关论文: A Two Stage Mechanism For Selling Random Power
We consider a double-auction mechanism, which was recently proposed in the context of rate allocation in mobile data-offloading markets. Network operators (users) derive benefit from offloading their traffic to third party WiFi or femtocell…
We design approximate weakly group strategy-proof mechanisms for resource reallocation problems using Milgrom and Segal's deferred acceptance auction framework: the radio spectrum and network bandwidth reallocation problems in the…
This paper studies multi-unit auctions powered by intermediaries, where each intermediary owns a private set of unit-demand buyers and all intermediaries are networked with each other. Our goal is to incentivize the intermediaries to…
Contemporary industrial parks are challenged by the growing concerns about high cost and low efficiency of energy supply. Moreover, in the case of uncertain supply/demand, how to mobilize delay-tolerant elastic loads and compensate…
In this paper, we study spectrum allocation mechanisms in hierarchical multi-layer markets which are expected to proliferate in the near future based on the current spectrum policy reform proposals. We consider a setting where a state…
We propose a scenario-oriented approach for energy-reserve joint procurement and pricing for electricity market. In this model, without the empirical reserve requirements, reserve is procured according to all possible contingencies and…
The establishment of a single European day-ahead market has accomplished the integration of the regional day-ahead markets. However, the reserves provision and activation remain an exclusive responsibility of regional operators. This…
Wind power producers can benefit from forming coalitions to participate cooperatively in electricity markets. To support such collaboration, various profit allocation rules rooted in cooperative game theory have been proposed. However,…
We consider the problem of designing an expected-revenue maximizing mechanism for allocating multiple non-perishable goods of $k$ varieties to flexible consumers over $T$ time steps. In our model, a random number of goods of each variety…
The demand response provides an opportunity for load serving entities (LSEs) that operate retail electricity markets (REMs) to strategically purchase energy and provide reserves in wholesale electricity markets (WEMs). This paper concerns…
In this paper, a green wireless communication system in which base stations are powered by renewable energy sources is considered. This system consists of a capacity-constrained renewable power supplier (RPS) and a base station (BS) that…
Auctions have been proposed as a way to provide economic incentives for primary users to dynamically allocate unused spectrum to other users in need of it. Previously proposed schemes do not take into account the fact that the power…
This paper presents an integrated model for bidding energy storage in day-ahead and real-time markets to maximize profits. We show that in integrated two-stage bidding, the real-time bids are independent of day-ahead settlements, while the…
We study auctions that are robust at any scale, i.e., they can be applied to sell both expensive and cheap items and achieve the best multiplicative approximations of the optimal revenue in the worst case. We show that the optimal mechanism…
A promising approach to hedge against the inherent uncertainty of renewable generation is to equip the renewable plants with energy storage systems. This paper focuses on designing profit maximization offering strategies, i.e., the…
We provide a reduction from revenue maximization to welfare maximization in multi-dimensional Bayesian auctions with arbitrary (possibly combinatorial) feasibility constraints and independent bidders with arbitrary (possibly combinatorial)…
Building on the linear programming approach to competitive equilibrium pricing, we develop a general method for constructing iterative auctions that achieve Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) outcomes. We show how to transform a linear program…
Many important problems in multiagent systems involve resource allocations. Self-interested agents may lie about their valuations if doing so increases their own utilities. Therefore, it is necessary to design mechanisms (collective…
Mechanism design for one-sided markets has been investigated for several decades in economics and in computer science. More recently, there has been an increased attention on mechanisms for two-sided markets, in which buyers and sellers act…
This paper proposes a method for the stochastic estimation of Charging Stations prices based on dual decomposition. Prices are determined so as to minimize the social cost of the EVs while satisfying their constraints in expectation