相关论文: Reward Sharing Schemes for Stake Pools

We propose a framework for threshold cryptosystems under a permissionless-economic model in which the participants are rational profit-maximizing entities. To date, threshold cryptosystems have been considered under permissioned settings…

Sharding distributed ledgers is a promising on-chain solution for scaling blockchains but lacks formal grounds, nurturing skepticism on whether such complex systems can scale blockchains securely. We fill this gap by introducing the first…

In this paper we propose a double-linked blockchain data structure that greatly improves blockchain performance and guarantees single chain with no forks. Additionally, with the proposed proof-of-refundable-tax (PoRT) consensus algorithm,…

We study a game-theoretic model of blockchain mining economies and show that griefing, a practice according to which participants harm other participants at some lesser cost to themselves, is a prevalent threat at its Nash equilibria. The…

Our work focuses on the design of a scalable permissionless blockchain in the proof-of-stake setting. In particular, we use a distributed hash table as a building block to set up randomized shards, and then leverage the sharded architecture…

The Nakamoto longest chain protocol is remarkably simple and has been proven to provide security against any adversary with less than 50% of the total hashing power. Proof-of-stake (PoS) protocols are an energy efficient alternative;…

This paper introduces the Proof of Sampling (PoSP) protocol, a Nash Equilibrium-based verification mechanism, and its application to decentralized machine learning inference through spML. Our protocol has a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium,…

Play-to-earn is one of the prospective categories of decentralized applications. The play-to-earn projects combine blockchain technology with entertaining games and finance, attracting various participants. While huge amounts of capital…

Distributed ledger systems, such as blockchains, rely on consensus protocols that commit ordered messages for processing. In practice, message ordering within these systems is often reward-driven. This raises concerns about fairness,…

The goal of this paper is to establish the general framework of consensus equilibria for Mining-Pool Games in Blockchain Ecosystems, and with the explanation for the stability of in terms of the existence of consensus equilibria related to…

Regardless of their variations, blockchains require a consensus mechanism to validate transactions, supervise added blocks, maintain network security, synchronize the network state, and distribute incentives. Proof-of-Work (PoW), one of the…

The large majority of risk-sharing transactions involve few agents, each of whom can heavily influence the structure and the prices of securities. This paper proposes a game where agents' strategic sets consist of all possible sharing…

We design a protocol for dynamic prioritization of data on shared routers such as untethered 3G/4G devices. The mechanism prioritizes bandwidth in favor of users with the highest value, and is incentive compatible, so that users can simply…

We present a novel method for a multi-party, zero-trust validator infrastructure deployment arrangement via smart contracts to secure Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchains. The proposed arrangement architecture employs a combination of…

The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…

How to form groups in a mobility system that offers shared rides, and how to split the costs within the travellers of a group, are non-trivial tasks, as two objectives conflict: 1) minimising the total costs of the system, and 2) making…

We consider the existence and computational complexity of coalitional stability concepts based on social networks. Our concepts represent a natural and rich combinatorial generalization of a recent approach termed partition equilibrium. We…

In this paper, we propose FedChain, a novel framework for federated-blockchain systems, to enable effective transferring of tokens between different blockchain networks. Particularly, we first introduce a federated-blockchain system…

We propose a model for games in which the players have shared access to a blockchain that allows them to deploy smart contracts to act on their behalf. This changes fundamental game-theoretic assumptions about rationality since a contract…

Blockchain like Bitcoin and Ethereum suffer from scalability issues. Sharding is one of the most promising and leading solutions to scale blockchain. The basic idea behind sharding is to divide the blockchain network into multiple…