相关论文: Reward Sharing Schemes for Stake Pools

The security of blockchain systems based on Proof of Work relies on mining. However, mining suffers from unstable revenue, prompting many miners to form cooperative mining pools. Most existing mining pools operate in a centralized manner,…

As smart contract platforms autonomously manage billions of dollars of capital, quantifying the portfolio risk that investors engender in these systems is increasingly important. Recent work illustrates that Proof of Stake (PoS) is…

Decentralized storage is one of the most natural applications built on blockchains and a central component of the Web3 ecosystem. Yet despite a decade of active development -- from IPFS and Filecoin to more recent entrants -- most of these…

Blockchain technology offers decentralization and security but struggles with scalability, particularly in enterprise settings where efficiency and controlled access are paramount. Sharding is a promising solution for private blockchains,…

Cooperation is fundamental for human prosperity. Blockchain, as a trust machine, is a cooperative institution in cyberspace that supports cooperation through distributed trust with consensus protocols. While studies in computer science…

The paper studies an oligopolistic equilibrium model of financial agents who aim to share their random endowments. The risk-sharing securities and their prices are endogenously determined as the outcome of a strategic game played among all…

To participate in the distributed consensus of permissionless blockchains, prospective nodes -- or miners -- provide proof of designated, costly resources. However, in contrast to the intended decentralization, current data on blockchain…

Most concurrent blockchain systems rely heavily on the Proof-of-Work (PoW) or Proof-of-Stake (PoS) mechanisms for decentralized consensus and security assurance. However, the substantial energy expenditure stemming from computationally…

Consider a setting where selfish agents are to be assigned to coalitions or projects from a fixed set P. Each project k is characterized by a valuation function; v_k(S) is the value generated by a set S of agents working on project k. We…

Blockchain systems benefit from lessons in prior art such as fault tolerance, distributed systems, peer-to-peer systems, and game theory. In this paper we argue that blockchain algorithms should tolerate both rational (self-interested)…

This paper introduces Proof of Team Sprint (PoTS), a novel consensus algorithm designed to address the significant energy inefficiencies inherent in traditional Proof of Work (PoW) systems. PoTS shifts the consensus mechanism from an…

Proof-of-Stake systems randomly choose, on each round, one of the participants as a consensus leader that extends the chain with the next block such that the selection probability is proportional to the owned stake. However, distributed…

In game theory, a trusted mediator acting on behalf of the players can enable the attainment of correlated equilibria, which may provide better payoffs than those available from the Nash equilibria alone. We explore the approach of…

In cost sharing games with delays, a set of agents jointly allocates a finite subset of resources. Each resource has a fixed cost that has to be shared by the players, and each agent has a nonshareable player-specific delay for each…

We develop a continuous-time control approach to optimal trading in a Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchain, formulated as a consumption-investment problem that aims to strike the optimal balance between a participant's (or agent's) utility from…

Smart contracts are stateful programs deployed on blockchains; they secure over a trillion dollars in transaction value per year. High-stakes smart contracts often rely on timely alerts about external events, but prior work has not analyzed…

Matching platforms, such as online dating services and job recommendations, have become increasingly prevalent. For the success of these platforms, it is crucial to design reciprocal recommender systems (RRSs) that not only increase the…

Proof-of-Work (PoW) systems face critical challenges, including excessive energy consumption and the centralization of mining power among entities with expensive hardware. Static mining pools exacerbate these issues by reducing competition…

In cost sharing games, the existence and efficiency of pure Nash equilibria fundamentally depends on the method that is used to share the resources' costs. We consider a general class of resource allocation problems in which a set of…

Single-bridge blockchain solutions enable cross-chain communication. However, they are associated with centralization and single-point-of-failure risks. This paper proposes Proof of Success and Reward Distribution (PSCRD), a novel…