相关论文: Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing

We study fair allocation of constrained resources, where a market designer optimizes overall welfare while maintaining group fairness. In many large-scale settings, utilities are not known in advance, but are instead observed after…

We consider the problem of an auctioneer who faces the task of selling a good (drawn from a known distribution) to a set of buyers, when the auctioneer does not have the capacity to describe to the buyers the exact identity of the good that…

This paper introduces the targeted sampling model in optimal auction design. In this model, the seller may specify a quantile interval and sample from a buyer's prior restricted to the interval. This can be interpreted as allowing the…

I study the welfare-maximizing allocation of heterogeneous goods when monetary transfers are prohibited. Agents have private values, and the designer chooses a mechanism subject to incentive compatibility and aggregate supply constraints. I…

The paper designs revenue-maximizing auction mechanisms for agents who aim to maximize their total obtained values rather than the classical quasi-linear utilities. Several models have been proposed to capture the behaviors of such agents…

The Bayesian persuasion paradigm of strategic communication models interaction between a privately-informed agent, called the sender, and an ignorant but rational agent, called the receiver. The goal is typically to design a (near-)optimal…

The rapid development in data collecting devices and computation platforms produces an emerging number of agents, each equipped with a unique data modality over a particular population of subjects. While the predictive performance of an…

We consider a monopoly information holder selling information to a budget-constrained decision maker, who may benefit from the seller's information. The decision maker has a utility function that depends on his action and an uncertain state…

We consider the problem of allocating multiple indivisible items to a set of networked agents to maximize the social welfare subject to network externalities. Here, the social welfare is given by the sum of agents' utilities and…

This paper is merged with arXiv:2107.08965v2. We refer the reader to the full and updated version. We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with 2-value additive valuations. Our goal is to find an…

We study the problem of allocating indivisible items on a path among agents. The objective is to find a fair and efficient allocation in which each agent's bundle forms a contiguous block on the line. We say that an instance is \emph{$(a,…

Submodular over signal (SOS) defines a family of interesting functions for which there exist truthful mechanisms with constant approximation to the social welfare for agents with interdependent valuations. The best-known truthful auction is…

We propose a reliable intersection control mechanism for strategic autonomous and connected vehicles (agents) in non-cooperative environments. Each agent has access to his/her earliest possible and desired passing times, and reports a…

We study how to allocate resources to participants who can strategically misrepresent their deservingness at a cost. A principal assigns item(s) (or money) among multiple agents on the basis of their costly signals. Each agent's signal…

In this paper we study the problem of social learning under multiple true hypotheses and self-interested agents which exchange information over a graph. In this setup, each agent receives data that might be generated from a different…

A set of divisible resources becomes available over a sequence of rounds and needs to be allocated immediately and irrevocably. Our goal is to distribute these resources to maximize fairness and efficiency. Achieving any non-trivial…

We study hidden-action principal-agent problems with multiple agents. These are problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme in order to incentivize some agents to take costly, unobservable actions that lead…

We study a setting where Bayesian agents with a common prior have private information related to an event's outcome and sequentially make public announcements relating to their information. Our main result shows that when agents' private…

A principal has $m$ identical objects to allocate among a group of $n$ agents. Objects are desirable and the principal's value of assigning an object to an agent is the agent's private information. The principal can verify up to $k$ agents,…

We study the problem of fairly allocating $m$ indivisible items among $n$ agents. Envy-free allocations, in which each agent prefers her bundle to the bundle of every other agent, need not exist in the worst case. However, when agents have…