相关论文: Super-stability in the Student-Project Allocation …
We study a variant of the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students where ties are allowed in the preference lists of students and lecturers (SPA-ST). We investigate the concept of strong stability in this…
We study the Student Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students (SPA-S), which involves the assignment of students to projects based on student preferences over projects, lecturer preferences over students, and…
The Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students (SPA-S) comprises three sets of agents, namely students, projects and lecturers, where students have preferences over projects and lecturers have preferences…
We study the Student Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students (SPA-S), an extension of the well-known Stable Marriage and Hospital Residents problem. In this model, students have preferences over projects, each…
In the Student / Project Allocation problem (SPA) we seek to assign students to individual or group projects offered by lecturers. Students provide a list of projects they find acceptable in order of preference. Each student can be assigned…
In the {\sc Course Allocation} problem, there are a set of students and a set of courses at a given university. University courses may have different numbers of credits, typically related to different numbers of learning hours, and there…
Many countries around the world, including Korea, use the school choice lottery system. However, this method has a problem in that many students are assigned to less-preferred schools based on the lottery results. In addition, the task of…
We describe a solution to the student-project allocation problem using simulated annealing. The problem involves assigning students to projects, where each student has ranked a fixed number of projects in order of preference. Each project…
In this paper, we consider one-to-one matchings between two disjoint groups of agents. Each agent has a preference over a subset of the agents in the other group, and these preferences may contain ties. Strong stability is one of the…
The Stable Roommates problem with Ties and Incomplete lists (SRTI) is a matching problem characterized by the preferences of agents over other agents as roommates, where the preferences may have ties or be incomplete. SRTI asks for a…
Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for school or higher education assignment, or for entry-level labour markets. In this paper we explore the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning…
A group of $n$ agents with numerical preferences for each other are to be assigned to the $n$ seats of a dining table. We study two natural topologies:~circular (cycle) tables and panel (path) tables. For a given seating arrangement, an…
The stable roommates problem is a non-bipartite version of the stable matching problem in a bipartite graph. In this paper, we consider the stable roommates problem with ties. In particular, we focus on strong stability, which is one of the…
We consider two variants of the classical Stable Roommates problem with Incomplete (but strictly ordered) preference lists SRI that are degree constrained, i.e., preference lists are of bounded length. The first variant, EGAL d-SRI,…
The Stable Roommates problem (SR) is characterized by the preferences of agents over other agents as roommates: each agent ranks all others in strict order of preference. A solution to SR is then a partition of the agents into pairs so that…
We study stable matching problems where agents have multilayer preferences: There are $\ell$ layers each consisting of one preference relation for each agent. Recently, Chen et al. [EC '18] studied such problems with strict preferences,…
Motivated by group-project distribution, we introduce and study stable matching under the constraint of applicants needing to share a location to be matched with the same institute, which we call the Location-Restricted Stable Matching…
In a two-sided matching market when agents on both sides have preferences the stability of the solution is typically the most important requirement. However, we may also face some distributional constraints with regard to the minimum number…
We introduce the {\sc classified stable matching} problem, a problem motivated by academic hiring. Suppose that a number of institutes are hiring faculty members from a pool of applicants. Both institutes and applicants have preferences…
The stable roommates problem can admit multiple different stable matchings. We have different criteria for deciding which one is optimal, but computing those is often NP-hard. We show that the problem of finding generous or rank-maximal…