相关论文: Negotiation Strategies for Agents with Ordinal Pre…

We introduce a methodology and framework for expressing general preference information in logic programming under the answer set semantics. An ordered logic program is an extended logic program in which rules are named by unique terms, and…

Economic theory has provided an estimable intuition in understanding the perplexing ideologies in law, in the areas of economic law, tort law, contract law, procedural law and many others. Most legal systems require the parties involved in…

We consider the one-sided matching problem, where n agents have preferences over n items, and these preferences are induced by underlying cardinal valuation functions. The goal is to match every agent to a single item so as to maximize the…

We propose and solve a negotiation model of multiple players facing many alternative solutions. The model can be generalized to many relevant circumstances where stakeholders' interests partially overlap and partially oppose. We also show…

Fairness is a desirable and crucial property of many protocols that handle, for instance, exchanges of message. It states that if at least one agent engaging in the protocol is honest, then either the protocol will unfold correctly and…

We introduce the study of sequential information elicitation in strategic multi-agent systems. In an information elicitation setup a center attempts to compute the value of a function based on private information (a-k-a secrets) accessible…

Contract scheduling is a general technique that allows to design a system with interruptible capabilities, given an algorithm that is not necessarily interruptible. Previous work on this topic has largely assumed that the interruption is a…

Many real-life contractual relations differ completely from the clean, static model at the heart of principal-agent theory. Typically, they involve repeated strategic interactions of the principal and agent, taking place under uncertainty…

A well-intentioned principal provides information to a rationally inattentive agent without internalizing the agent's cost of processing information. Whatever information the principal makes available, the agent may choose to ignore some.…

We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods to multiple agents. Recent work [Bouveret and Lang, 2011] focused on allocating goods in a sequential way, and studied what is the "best" sequence of agents to pick objects based…

Traditionally, the formation of vocabularies has been studied by agent-based models (specially, the Naming Game) in which random pairs of agents negotiate word-meaning associations at each discrete time step. This paper proposes a first…

We study a dynamic market setting where an intermediary interacts with an unknown large sequence of agents that can be either sellers or buyers: their identities, as well as the sequence length $n$, are decided in an adversarial, online…

This paper studies algorithmic decision-making under human's strategic behavior, where a decision maker uses an algorithm to make decisions about human agents, and the latter with information about the algorithm may exert effort…

The buying and selling of information is taking place at a scale unprecedented in the history of commerce, thanks to the formation of online marketplaces for user data. Data providing agencies sell user information to advertisers to allow…

Consider learning a decision support assistant to serve as an intermediary between (oracle) expert behavior and (imperfect) human behavior: At each time, the algorithm observes an action chosen by a fallible agent, and decides whether to…

New fairness notions aligned with the merit principle are proposed for designing exchange rules. We show that for an obviously strategy-proof, efficient and individually rational rule, (i) an agent receives her favorite object when others…

In this work we propose an ontology to support automated negotiation in multiagent systems. The ontology can be connected with some domain-specific ontologies to facilitate the negotiation in different domains, such as Intelligent…

We consider two-person bargaining problems in which (only) the disagreement outcome is private (and possibly correlated) information and it is common knowledge that disagreement is inefficient. We show that if the Pareto frontier is linear,…

In applications such as recommendation systems and revenue management, it is important to predict preferences on items that have not been seen by a user or predict outcomes of comparisons among those that have never been compared. A popular…

We study bilateral trade with interdependent values as an informed-principal problem. The mechanism-selection game has multiple equilibria that differ with respect to principal's payoff and trading surplus. We characterize the equilibrium…